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Capacity to Contest a Search
and Seizure: the Passing of Old Rules
and Some Suggestions for New Ones
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN*
Professor Slobogin examines recent Supreme Court decisions involving standing
to challenge search and seizure violations, and argues that the Court's commit-
ment to a "totality of the circumstances" approach has permitted erosion of
fourth amendment protections. After concluding that these decisions provide lit-
tle guidance to lower courts, Professor Slobogin offers a set of principles which
will aid in analyzing the Court's direction.
I. INTRODUCTION
Illegally obtained evidence may be suppressed under the exclusionary principle of Mapp v.
Ohio) only by those individuals who "belong to the class for whose sake the constitutional
protection is given."'2 Until recently, the Supreme Court phrased its analysis of this issue in
terms of the defendant's "standing" to contest a search and seizure, and relied on a number of
fairly concrete standing rules to define the class of individuals who could seek fourth amend-
ment protection. In Rakas v. Illinois, 3 however, the Court substantially altered both the form
and the substance of this inquiry. It first indicated that it would no longer resort to standing
terminology in discussing who can contest a search and seizure. The majority stated that
reference to this language only served to obscure the fact that a person's capacity to challenge
police illegality should depend entirely upon the scope of his fourth amendment right. 4 It then
defined that right as the product solely of a person's "legitimate expectations of privacy." 5
Without such an expectation in the place invaded by government agents, the Court concluded,
one could not contest a search of that place.
6
It is difficult to quibble with Rakas's rejection of standing terminology in favor of an "analysis
forthrightly focus[ing] on the extent of a particular defendant's rights under the Fourth Amend-
ment;"'7 this holding merely substitutes one label for another. Under article III of the Constitu-
tion, 8 a litigant has standing to bring a constitutional claim if he can show that the government
caused him to suffer "an injury to himself that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision." 9
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Virginia; B.A., 1973, Princeton University; J.D., 1977,
LL.M., 1978, University of Virginia. The author wishes to thank Professors Charles H. Whitebread and
John Calvin Jefferies, Jr., of the University of Virginia Law School, as well as Jeff Gleason and Susann
Gill, for their valuable assistance on this article.
1. 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961). Evidence procured through an unlawful search and seizure may be ex-
cluded from evidence at trial. Id. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914), applied this rule to
the federal courts. Mapp extended its application to the state courts. 367 U.S. at 655.
2. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152, 160 (1907).
3. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
4. Id. at 138-40; see text accompanying notes 70 through 71 infra.
5. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 142.
6. Id. at 143, 148; see text accompanying notes 77 through 80 infra.
7. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 139.
8. Article III permits the federal courts to try only certain "cases" and "controversies." The Court has
construed this clause to limit the authority of the courts as defined by, inter alia, notions of justiciability,
mootness, and standing. See generally C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 38-52 (3d ed. 1976).
9. See Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights, 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976). The Court continues on to
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In many areas involving constitutional issues, before the litigant can be deemed to have
standing, he must also prove that his claim is based on an alleged violation of his own constitu-
tional rights, rather than those of a third party.' 0 This requirement is strictly observed in the
fourth amendment context. The Court has consistently held that "Fourth Amendment rights
... may not be vicariously asserted;"II the defendant must show he was "a victim of a search
and seizure," 12 one whose own protection was infringed. 13 For instance, the Court has held
that a defendant generally does not have standing to contest an electronic eavesdrop of a con-
versation in which he did not participate, even when the state seeks to use information
garnered from that conversation against him.14 Rakas merely recognized that the Court's
"long history of insistence that Fourth Amendment rights are personal in nature has already
answered many of [the] traditional standing inquiries, [and thus] the definition of those rights
is more properly placed within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law than within
that of standing."'15
Of far greater significance than this conceptual modification is Rakas's redefinition of the
protection afforded each citizen by the fourth amendment. Relying heavily on the expectation
of privacy rubric adopted in Rakas, the Court's decision in Rakas itself and in two cases decid-
ed last term, Rawlings v. Kentucky16 and United States v. Salvucci, 17 discarded the old stand-
ing rules and reduced the class of individuals who can contest a search and seizure. With these
decisions, the Court has opened up yet another front in its assault on the fourth amendment.
In other recent opinions, the Court has broadened the types of state action that are con-
say that "[aibsent such a showing, exercise of its power by a federal court would be gratuitous, and thus
inconsistent with the Article III limitation." Id. See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (to have
constitutional standing one must have "a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy [so] as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of the issues"). Obviously, any criminal
defendant could easily satisfy this criterion. See Williamson, Fourth Amendment Standing and Expecta-
tions of Privacy: Rakas v. Illinois and New Directions for Some Old Concepts, 31 U. FLA. L. REv. 831,
865 (1979)[hereinafter cited as Williamson].
10. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) ("the [party] generally must assert his own legal
rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties");
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973) (privilege against self-incrimination is a "personal
right"); Tiles v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943) ("[nlo question is raised in the record with respect to the
deprivation of appellant's liberty or property in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment"). But cf.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965) (physicians criminally convicted for dispensing con-
traceptives have standing to challenge state statute prohibiting use of contraceptives).
11. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969) (no fourth amendment right to suppress
evidence obtained through electronic surveillance which violated another party's rights).
12. This language was first used by the Supreme Court in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261
(1960).
13. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 133.
14. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. at 174-75. Alderman excepted from this restriction individuals
who own the tapped premises. Id. at 176-80. See also text accompanying notes 59 through 60 infra.
15. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 140. It could be argued that because the fourth amendment guarantees
"the right of the people to be secure ... against unreasonable searches and seizures" (emphasis added),
the exclusionary rule should be available to every citizen, even a person not a party to a prosecution.
More reasonably, the fourth amendment could be seen as granting every criminal defendant "a personal
right.., to insist that the state utilize only lawful means of proceeding against him." Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. at 206 (Fortas, J., dissenting). As implied by the above discussion, the Court has never
seriously considered either of these alternatives, see id. at 206-07, nor has it been willing to adopt the so-
called "target theory" of standing, which could confer fourth amendment protection on anyone against
whom the search was directed. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 133-38. See also note 71 infra.
16. 100 S. Ct. 2556, 2561-62 (1980) (owner of drugs found in police search of third party's purse had no
standing to challenge search).
17. 100 S. Ct. 2547, 2552-53 (1980) (no "automatic standing" for defendants charged with possessory
crimes).
[Vol. 18:387
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sidered "reasonable" under that amendment, 18 and has restricted state defendants' access to
federal court collateral review of fourth amendment claims. 19 With Rakas, Rawlings, and
Salvucci, it has revamped the standing inquiry in a manner which, in effect, narrows the scope
of the fourth amendment itself.
This article will not, however, engage in detailed criticism of the Court's reasoning on this
issue or suggest alternative approaches to the standing inquiry. Both of these tasks have been
ably undertaken elsewhere. 20 Instead, this article will examine the Court's current stance on
the scope of the fourth amendment, as elucidated by the above decisions. This article's
primary objective, therefore, is to define a set of principles that might replace the rules recent-
ly abandoned by the Court. After briefly describing the Court's most important decisions con-
cerning the capacity of a defendant to contest a search and seizure, it argues how these deci-
sions can and should be interpreted.
II. FROM JONES TO SAL VUCCI:
PROPERTY, PRESENCE, AND PRIVACY
While the Court has consistently held that a defendant asserting a fourth amendment claim
must prove he was a "victim" of the challenged police action, 21 it has vacillated in its attempts
to delineate the scope of a defendant's capacity to contest the legality of a search and seizure.
Originally, the Court measured this capacity according to the defendant's proprietary interest
in either the premises searched or the property seized. 22 In Jones v. United States,23 however,
the Court departed from a strict property analysis by granting standing to anyone "legitimate-
ly on the premises" at the time of the search. Jones also created what was later called
"automatic standing" for those charged with possessory offenses. 24 In Mancusi v. DeForte,25
18. See, e.g., Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 39-40 (1979) (police search of individual pursuant to
arrest under city ordinance, later found unconstitutional, reasonable because ordinance was "presump-
tively valid"); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-60 (1979) (body-cavity searches of pretrial detainees
justified on security grounds); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (full body search of
person arrested for traffic violation permissible).
19. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976) (no right to federal habeas corpus relief in
search and seizure cases when state courts have accorded defendant a "full and fair hearing"); Palmigiano
v. Houle, 618 F.2d 877, 882 (lst Cir. 1980) ("opportunity for full and fair litigation" of illegal arrest
claim provided in state habeas proceeding even where state misallocated burden of proof because
misallocation was harmless error); Moore v. Lane, 612 F.2d 1046, 1047 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam)
(relitigation of fourth amendment challenge to identification arising from photo evidence obtained dur-
ing illegal stop barred under Stone); Faulisi v. Pinkney, 611 F.2d 176, 178 (7th Cir. 1979) (per curiam)
(relitigation of fourth amendment challenge to identification produced after 24-hour pre-arrest detention
and after previous unsuccessful lineup barred under Stone); Sanders v. Oliver, 611 F.2d 804, 808 (10th
Cir. 1979) ("opportunity for full and fair litigation" provided by suppression hearing even though only af-
flant could testify and petitioner limited to cross-examination when review possible by state courts), cert.
denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3219 (Oct. 7, 1980).
20. See Grove, Suppression of Illegally Obtained Evidence: The Standing Requirement on Its Last Leg,
18 CATH. U.L. REv. 150 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Grove]; Gutterman, "A Person Aggrieved".: Standing
to Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence in Transition, 23 EMORY L.J. 111 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Gutter-
man]; White & Greenspan, Standing to Object to Search and Seizure, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 333 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as White & Greenspan]; Williamson, supra note 9; The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93
HARv. L. REV. 1, 171 (1979).
21. See note 12 supra.
22. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 492 (1963) (narcotics taken from co-defendant ad-
missible against defendant whose right of privacy in person and premises not violated during seizure). It
appears that before Jones, this standard was followed by the lower courts. See generally Edwards, Stan-
ding to Suppress Unreasonably Seized Evidence, 47 Nw. U.L. REV. 471, 472 (1952).
23. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
24. Id. at 264.
25. 392 U.S. 364 (1968) (union official had reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental in-
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the Court further expanded the scope of the fourth amendment by holding that a defendant has
standing to challenge the admissibility of evidence obtained by any police conduct that violates
his reasonable expectation of privacy, a concept originally developed by Justice Harlan in Katz
v. United States.26 Beginning with Rakas, however, the Court utilized the expectation-of-
privacy rationale to curtail substantive fourth amendment protection. In Rakas itself, the Court
used the privacy rationale to justify overruling that part of Jones which adopted the legitimate
presence test; in Rawlings, the Court held that proof of possession of the seized evidence, by
itself, does not establish the requisite legitimate expectation of privacy; and, in Salvucci, the
Court relied partially on the privacy rationale to abolish "automatic standing."
A. ABANDONING PROPERTY-BASED STANDING: JONES
In Jones v. United States,27 the Court, for the first time, explicitly eschewed a property-
based analysis of fourth amendment standing. 28 Police found the narcotics used to convict
Jones while he was in the apartment of his friend Evans. 29 Jones neither owned nor leased the
premises, but Evans had given him a key to the apartment and had been away for five days
when police conducted the search in question.30 Reversing the lower court, 31 Justice
Frankfurter first defined a "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure" 32 as one who
is "a victim of a search and seizure, one against whom the search was directed, as distinguished
from one who claims prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of
a search or seizure directed at someone else."'33 Thus, "ordinarily . . . one who seeks to
challenge the legality of a search [must prove] ... that he himself was the victim of an invasion
of privacy."
'34
Justice Frankfurter immediately created an exception to this rule, however, for cases involv-
ing possessory offenses. He noted that the existing property-based standing rule created a
dilemma for defendants charged with such crimes by forcing them to choose at the suppres-
sion hearing between conceding the primary element of the charge against them-posses-
sion- and foregoing a challenge of the search altogether for fear of providing the state with
trusion in office shared with other union officials).
26. 389 U.S. 347, 360-62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (majority held warrantless placement of
electronic listening device on outside of public telephone booth violated defendant's fourth amendment
rights).
27. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
28. In United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951), the Court granted standing to a defendant whose
property was seized by police from a hotel room rented by his aunts and in which he did not live. The
Court's decision seemed to rely on his possessory interest in the seized goods as the grounds for the
Court's decision, id. at 54, though the present Court has held that the conclusion in Jeffers was based on
the defendant's interest in the searched premises as well. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 128; see text accom-
panying notes 152 through 158 infra. To the extent the former interpretation is correct, Jeffers presaged
Jones's explicit holding that one who does not have a property interest in the searched premises can still
have standing to contest its search.
29. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. at 258-59.
30. Id. at 259. Jones also stated that he kept a suit and shirt at the apartment and that he had slept there
"maybe a night." He lived elsewhere, however, and did not pay Evans for use of the room.
31. The D.C. Circuit held that Jones lacked standing to challenge the adequacy of the search warrant
because he disclaimed ownership of the seized property and alleged an interest in the apartment no greater
than that of an invitee or guest. Jones v. United States, 262 F.2d 234, 236 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
32. In Jones, 362 U.S. at 260, the Court was actually construing rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which details the grounds upon which "[a] person aggrieved by an unlawful search
and seizure may move ... to suppress for use as evidence anything so obtained." Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e),
362 U.S. at 260.
33. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. at 261.
34. Id.
[Vo1.18:387
HeinOnline  -- 18 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 390 1980-1981
CAPACITY TO CONTEST A SEARCH AND SEIZURE
incriminating evidence. 35 He also pointed out that the existing rule encouraged the Govern-
ment to contend at the pretrial stage that the defendant did not possess the alleged contraband
and to argue at trial that he was its owner. As Justice Frankfurter put it, "[it is not consonant
with the amenities, to put it mildly, of the administration of criminal justice to sanction such
squarely contradictory assertions of power by the government." 36 Given the self-incrimination
dilemma and the potential for governmental contradiction, the Court held that in cases where
the indictment charges possession, the defendant should be able to challenge the legality of a
search and seizure without having first to prove he has standing to do so. 37 Because Jones was
charged with such an offense, he benefited from this "automatic standing" rule.
In addition, the Court identified a second independent ground that conferred standing on
Jones. The Court found existing property-based guidelines to be artificial; it held the distinc-
tions between "lessee," "licensee," "invitee," and "guest" to be only of "gossamer" strength.
Accordingly, the Court repudiated the framework utilizing these concepts in favor of granting
standing to "anyone legitimately on the premises where a search occurs. '38 While exposing the
inadequacy of relying on a property-based standard, the Court made no explicit connection
between the new legitimate presence test and privacy concepts.
B. EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY: KA TZ, DEFoRTE, AND ALDERMAN
The beginning of the end for Jones came in 1967 with the Court's decision in Katz v. United
States.39 While the Court did not utilize standing terminology in Katz, the case ultimately
became the cornerstone of the Court's approach to standing, and figured significantly in the
demise of both tests set out in Jones. In Katz, FBI agents obtained incriminating information
through use of an electronic eavesdropping device attached to a public phone booth from
which Katz often placed his calls concerning illegal gambling activity. 40 The Court's primary
interest was whether the agents' action constituted a search under the fourth amendment. The
Court stated that "what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or of-
fice, is not a subject of fourth amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." 41 The
bugging device infringed upon the privacy Katz expected to flow from "occupy[ing] the booth,
shut[ting] the door behind him, and pay[ing] the toll that permit[ted] him to place a call." 42
The Government contended in Katz that a telephone booth was not a "constitutionally pro-
tected area," such as the home,43 and that, even if it were, there had been no physical penetra-
tion of the booth and thus no trespass on Katz's privacy. 44 Justice Stewart's majority opinion,
35. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. at 261-63.
36. Id. at 263-64.
37. Id. at 264.
38. Id. at 266-67. Justice Frankfurter weakly linked this new standard with the substantive protection
of the fourth amendment by noting that it was:
unnecessary and ill-advised to comport into the law surrounding the constitutional right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined
by the common law in evolving the body of private property law which, more than almost
any other brand of law, has been shaped by distinctions whose validity is largely historical.
Id. at 266.
39. 389 U.S. 352 (1967).
40. Id. at 354.
41. Id. at 351-52 (footnotes omitted).
42. Id. at 352.
43. Id. at 351 & n.8.
44. Id. at 352.
19811
HeinOnline  -- 18 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 391 1980-1981
AMERIcAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
however, held that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places, '45 implying that, in
defining whether a search has occurred, property interests are secondary to the individual's ex-
pectation of privacy in the premises from which the evidence is seized. Stewart explicitly over-
ruled prior eavesdropping cases which required that a physical trespass occur before fourth
amendment protection is implicated.46
The expectation of privacy language made its first appearance in Justice Harlan's concur-
rence. Justice Harlan took the majority opinion to mean, inter alia, "that an enclosed phone
booth is an area where, like a house ... a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable
expectation of privacy." 47 He noted that while the fourth amendment may protect people and
not places, determining who has a reasonable expectation of privacy "requires reference to a
'place."' 48 Thus, he stated, "a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects
privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the 'plain view' of outsiders
are not 'protected' because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited. ' 49
The following year the Court applied the expectation of privacy rationale in a manner that
put the continued vitality of the "legitimately on the premises" test in doubt. In Mancusi v.
DeForte, 50 the Court could easily have used the Jones rule to support the defendant's standing
but instead applied Katz's language to the standing issue. 51 In DeForte, state officials searched
a large, one-room office shared by DeForte and other union officials in the presence of
DeForte and without his or his colleague's consent. 52 Union records seized from DeForte's
custody during this search were used to convict him of conspiracy and extortion. 53 In holding
that DeForte had standing to challenge the search and seizure, the Court cited both Jones and
Katz, but emphasized DeForte's privacy interest as opposed to his presence on the premises. 54
The Court stated that in a "private" office,
DeForte would have been entitled to expect that he would not be disturbed except
by personal or business invitees, and that records would not be taken except with
his permission or that of his union superiors. It seems to us that the situation was
not fundamentally changed because DeForte shared an office with other union
officers. DeForte still could reasonably have expected that only those persons and
their personal or business guests would enter the office, and that records would
not be touched except with their permission or that of union higher-ups. 55
The Court applied DeForte in Alderman v. United States,56 which, like Katz, involved the
admissibility of evidence procured through electronic surveillance. The Court dealt with the
standing issue as it concerned three classes of individuals. It reiterated that parties to an
overheard conversation may challenge the use of material obtained through eavesdropping.5 7
45. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351.
46. Id. at 353. Justice Stewart stated that Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928), and
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135 (1942), both requiring physical penetration of the searched
premises, "can no longer be regarded as controlling." Id.
47. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 361.
49. Id.
50. 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
51. Id. at 368.
52. Id. at 365.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 368.
55. Id. at 369.
56. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
57. Id. at 176.
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It also held that those who are not parties to such a conversation generally lack standing
because, under Jones, they are not the "victims" of a search and seizure.58
The Court carved an exception out of this latter group, however, by holding that the owner of
the tapped premises does have standing, even if he is not a party to the seized conversation or was
not present at the time it took place. 5 9 Citing DeForte, the Court emphasized that the invasion of
a person's house, in itself, is enough to give the homeowner standing to contest the seizure of pro-
perty from it, based on his right to enjoy the privacy of his home. 60 With the adoption of the ex-
pectation of privacy analysis in Katz, DeForte, and Alderman, the Court seemed to expand the
scope of the fourth amendment; it conferred constitutional protection on the occupant of a
phone booth, a business official who shared his office with several colleagues and did not own
the papers seized from it, and a person absent at the time of a search of his house that resulted in
the seizure of property belonging to someone else. It is doubtful whether any of these individuals
could have asserted a fourth amendment claim prior to Katz. 6 ,
Yet the Court's subsequent application of the expectation of privacy rationale revealed that
it could be utilized to reduce, as well as expand, the scope of fourth amendment protection.
C. EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY: RAKAS AND RAWLINGS
Rakas v. Illinois6 2 and Rawlings v. Kentucky6 3 firmly established the expectation-of-privacy
58. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. at 174-75. The Court stated:
There is no necessity to exclude evidence against one defendant in order to protect the rights
of another....
... [W]e think there is a substantial difference for constitutional purposes between preven-
ting the incrimination of a defendant through the very evidence illegally seized from him and
suppressing evidence on the motion of a party who cannot claim this predicate for exclusion.
Id. at 174.
59. Id. at 176. Justice Harlan's dissent argued that a conversation overheard in a house when its owner
is not present cannot possibly be an invasion of the owner's right to engage in private conversation. Id. at
189-94. But, the majority countered, because "[n]othing seen or found on the premises [during an unwar-
ranted search of a house] may legally form the basis for an arrest or search warrant or for testimony at the
homeowner's trial," id. at 177, nothing heard on those premises during such a search should be admissible
during his trial. Id. at 180.
60. Id. at 179 n. 11. By subjecting one's home to electronic surveillance, "officialdom invades an area in
which the homeowner has the right to expect privacy for himself, his family, and his invitees, and the
right to object to the use against him of the fruits of that invasion, not because the rights of others have
been violated, but because his own were.... Cf. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 367-370 (1968)." Id.
61. Katz obviously had no proprietary interest in the place searched. While he was legitimately on the
premises searched, it is unlikely that Jones, which involved the search of a house, would have been ap-
plied in such a situation; the Court did not refer to Jones in Katz. In DeForte, as mentioned in the text ac-
companying note 50 supra, the Court seemed reluctant to apply Jones. While it had previously held that
one could have standing to object to a search of his private office, United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S.
452, 463 (1932) (arrest no pretext for search for evidence in office); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S.
298, 305 (1921) (secret taking of evidence whether from defendant's house or office by government
representative violated fourth amendment), the Court would have been hard-pressed, before Katz, to
grant standing to someone who shared his office and files with several others. The fact that the papers
seized belonged to the union would have made it impossible for DeForte to contest the search on the
ground that he possessed an interest in them. In Alderman, although it is unclear from the opinion
whether there was an actual physical trespass by the electronic surveillance device, 394 U.S. at 170 n.3,
the absence of such an intrusion would have foreclosed a fourth amendment challenge before Katz, which
reversed earlier cases requiring a physical intrusion. See note 46 supra. Moreover, without the Katz
expectation-of-privacy rationale to justify the homeowner's interest in the privacy of his invitees, see note
41 supra, it is doubtful that an absent homeowner could have contested the seizure of someone else's pro-
perty from his home. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. at 190 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
62. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
63. 100 S. Ct. 2556 (1980).
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test for analyzing the scope of the fourth amendment and used it to modify significantly the
Court's previous fourth amendment jurisprudence.
Rakas involved the search of a car which police stopped after linking it to a description of
the getaway car used in a recent robbery. 64 They found the vehicle occupied by the two peti-
tioners and two women, one of whom owned the car and was driving it at the time of the
stop.65 After ordering the occupants out of the car, the police found a shotgun under the front
passenger seat and rifle shells in the locked glove compartment. 66 At their suppresesion hear-
ing, the petitioners did not claim a possessory interest in the car, the gun, or the shells. 67 The
petitioners were denied standing to contest the search and the latter two items were introduced
into evidence at their trial. 68 On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court held that "without a pro-
prietary or other similar interest in an automobile, a mere passenger therein lacks standing to
challenge the legality of the search of the vehicle." 69
In affirming the Illinois courts, Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion began by recasting the
standing inquiry. He correctly noted that traditional standing analysis did not differ in prac-
tical effect from the analysis courts undertook in determining when a search had taken
place. 70 "[T]he better analysis forthrightly focuses on the extent of a particular defendant's
rights under the Fourth Amendment, rather than on any theoretically separate, but invariably
intertwined concept of standing."
'71
Justice Rehnquist then illustrated the breadth of this conceptually new approach in con-
sidering the petitioners' argument that they should be able to contest the search because they
were legitimately in the automobile when the officers confronted them. He held that "the
phrase 'legitimately on premises' coined in Jones creates too broad a gauge for measurement
of fourth amendment rights;" '72 it advanced no purpose served by the fourth amendment to ex-
tend to every casual visitor the capacity to object to a search. 73 Jones, he concluded, "on its
64. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 130.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. & n.l.
68. Id. at 131.
69. 46 Ill. App. 3d 569, 571 360 N.E.2d 1252, 1253 (1977).
70. 439 U.S. at 139. Justice Rehnquist illustrated this point by noting that Katz and DeForte involved
the same expectation of privacy inquiry even though the first opinion focused on the defendant's fourth
amendment rights and the second concentrated on the standing issue. Id. at n.7.
71. Id. at 139. Before Justice Rehnquist could reach this conclusion, he had to dispose of petitioners'
contention that they should be able to assert the fourth amendment because the search in Rakas was
directed at them. As support for this "target theory" of standing, petitioners pointed to the language in
Jones stating that standing could be asserted by one who was "a victim of search and seizure, one against
whom the search was directed." 362 U.S. 257, 261. Justice Rehnquist pointed out that this theory had
been "impliedly repudiated" by the Court in Alderman when it held that persons who are not parties to an
unlawfully heard conversation (and who do not own the tapped premises) can never have standing. See
394 U.S. at 165. The majority in Alderman also ignored Justice Fortas's argument that the target theory
should be adopted. Id. at 207-09 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
Commentators argue that the target approach to standing would most effectively realize the deterrent
purpose of the exclusionary rule by letting police know that anyone who they are "after" at the time of the
search will have standing to contest their actions. White & Greenspan, supra note 20, at 349-54. Justice
Rehnquist felt, however, that this approach would permit too many defendants to exclude evidence, thereby
"enact[ing] a substantial cost for the vindication of the Fourth Amendment and keeping . . . reliable
evidence ... from the trier of fact." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 137. Of course, adopting the target ap-
proach would create standing for persons whose substantive fourth amendment rights have not been direct-
ly violated, thereby making it impossible to equate the standing inquiry and traditional fourth amendment
jurisprudence as Justice Rehnquist equated them. See text accompanying notes 4 through 15 supra.
72. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 142.
73. Id.
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facts merely stands for the unremarkable proposition that a person can have a legally suffi-
cient interest in a place other than his own home." 74 While one's legitimate presence on the
premises would not be irrelevant after Rakas, it would no longer be "controlling."
75
In defining the scope of fourth amendment protection after this repudiation of Jones,
Justice Rehnquist found guidance in Katz's reference to expectations of privacy. 76 In a foot-
note, he explained that legitimate expectations of privacy "must have a source outside of the
Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to
understandings that are recognized and permitted by society." 77 He found that Jones's fourth
amendment right was more properly analyzed as a legitimate expectation that the searched
property was his private domain than as a privilege arising out of his mere presence there:
Jones not only had permission to use the apartment of his friend, but had a key to
the apartment with which he admitted himself on the day of the search and kept
possessions in the apartment. Except with respect to his friend, Jones had com-
plete dominion and control over the apartment and could exclude others from
it.78
Justice Rehnquist noted that Katz likewise shut the door of the phone booth "to exclude all
others." 79 He concluded that the passenger of a car, "qua passenger," possesses a lower expec-
tation of privacy. 80
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell suggested that the result in Rakas was largely
dependent upon the fact that it involved the search of a car, in which there is significantly less
of a privacy interest than in a house.8 1 Yet none of the reasons Justice Powell gave for afford-
ing the car a lessened degree of privacy-its visible interior, its constant use in public places,
and its highly regulated nature82-explains why the contents of a locked glove compartment
would not be protected. 83 In Rawlings v. Kentucky,8 4 the Court cemented the position of the
legitimate expectation of privacy rationale as the sole determinant of one's capacity to contest
a search and seizure.8 5 The search in Rawlings occurred when six police officers entered the
house of Marquess with a warrant for his arrest. 86 Inside the house, they were unable to find
Marquess but did find five others, including Rawlings; they also smelled marijuana smoke and
saw marijuana seeds on the mantel in one of the house's bedrooms. 87 The officers decided to
74. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 142.
75. Id. at 148.
76. Id. at 143.
77. Id. at 143 n.12.
78. Id. at 149.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 148-49.
81. Id. at 153-54. The Court stated in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), "one's ex-
pectation of privacy in an automobile and of freedom in its operation are significantly different from the
traditional expectation of privacy and freedom in one's residence." Id. at 561.
82. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 154 n.2.
83. Moreover, Justice Rehnquist stated that the petitioners' claim would fail "even in an analogous
situation in a dwelling place." Id. at 148. The trunk and glove compartment of a car, id. at 148-49, and
the basement of a home, id. at 142, are areas where a mere passenger and a casual visitor in the kitchen of
a home, respectively, have no legitimate expectation of privacy.
84. 100 S. Ct. 2556 (1980).
85. Id. Rawlings involved three fourth amendment issues. The two issues not involving standing con-
cerned whether petitioner's admission of ownership of the drugs was the fruit of an illegal detention and
whether the post-admission search of petitioner's person was illegal. Id. at 2560-61.
86. Id. at 2559.
87. Id.
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obtain a search warrant prior to searching the house and its occupants. 88 While two of them
went to obtain the warrant, the other four detained the five occupants, informing them that
they could leave only if they consented to a body search.8 9 Two did so, although Saddler, a
roommate in the house, and Rawlings and Cox, both visitors, remained. 90 The officers return-
ed with a warrant authorizing a search of the house (but not its occupants) forty-five minutes
later. 91 At the time, Cox and Rawlings were seated on a couch with Cox's purse between
them. 92 One officer ordered Cox to empty her purse onto the table in front of the couch; out
came a jar of LSD and a number of smaller vials containing other illicit drugs.93 Cox turned to
Rawlings and told him "to take what was his," at which time Rawlings claimed ownership of
the drugs.94
At the suppression hearing prior to his trial on narcotics charges, Rawlings claimed that the
search of the purse was the fruit of an illegal detention and an invalid search warrant. 95 He ad-
mitted that he dumped the drugs into Cox's purse just prior to the police's arrival, but he
claimed that upon doing so, he asked her "if she would carry this for me, and she said 'yes.'" 96
Cox claimed, however, that when she saw Rawlings put drugs into her purse, she said "would
you please take this. I do not want this is my purse," to which Rawlings replied "Okay, just a
minute, I will." 97 Both Rawlings and Cox agreed that he left the room immediately after put-
ting the drugs into her purse. 98 Upon his return, the police had arrived. 99
The Kentucky Supreme Court held that Rawlings did not have standing to challenge the
search of Cox's purse because he had no "legitimate or reasonable expectation of freedom
from governmental intrusion" into Cox's purse.100 Justice Rehnquist, writing the majority opi-
nion, agreed. Assuming that Cox had accepted the drugs, he found that the "precipitous
nature" of the bailment precluded a finding that Rawlings had a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the purse. 101 Rejecting Rawlings's assertion of standing based on ownership of the
drugs, Justice Rehnquist stated:
While petitoner's ownership of the drugs is undoubtedly one fact to be considered
in this case, Rakas emphatically rejected the notion that 'arcane' concepts of pro-
perty law ought to control the ability to claim the protections of the Fourth
Amendment .... Had petitioner placed his drugs in plain view, he would still
have owned them, but he could not claim any legitimate expectation of
privacy. 102







95. See id. at 2560.
%. Id.
97. Id. at 2560 n. 1.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2560.
100. Rawlings v. Commonwealth, 581 S.W.2d 348, 350 (Ky. 1979) (considering the totality of the cir-
cumstances, Rawlings made an insufficient showing that his legitimate or reasonable expectations of
privacy were violated).
101. Rawlings v. Kentucky, at 2561. Justice Rehnquist actually listed four reasons why the defendant
did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the purse. For further discussion, see text accompany-
ing notes 121 through 124 infra.
102. Id. at 2562 (although petitioner might have had standing prior to Rakas, claim on merits would
likely have failed).
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Thus, Rawlings emphasized that a party's privacy interest in the searched area - whether it be a
house or a purse-would be the primary determinant of a party's fourth amendment interest.
Note the subtle shift in the expectation of privacy analysis in Rakas and Rawlings. As the test
was initially articulated, the "capacity to claim the protection of the [Fourth] Amendment
depends not only upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the area was one
in which there was a reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion.
'10 3
Justice White's most telling point in his Rakas dissent was his perception that "the distinctions
the [Rakas majority] would draw are based on relationships between private parties, but the
Fourth Amendment is concerned with the relationship of one of those parties to the govern-
ment." 10 4 Expectations of privacy that are unreasonable with respect to ordinary citizens are
not necessarily unreasonable with respect to intrusions by the government. Deforte had very
little privacy with respect to his colleagues or their guests, but the Court still found his "expec-
tation . . defeated by the entrance of the state officials."'1 05 The defendants in Rakas and
Rawlings did not have complete control over who would have access to the property seized, but
that fact should not necessarily defeat an expectation that the property would be free from
governmental intrusion. To require complete control of one's property before one can
reasonably expect the protection of the fourth amendment would dramatically diminish a per-
son's freedom to interact with others and would destroy a vital element of our social structure.
To avoid this result the holdings in Rakas and Rawlings should be tied to the peculiar facts of
those cases- the seizure of property not claimed by defendants from a car in which they were
passengers and the seizure of property claimed by the defendant which had been hastily shoved
into someone else's purse-rather than given broad scope.
D. AUTOMATIC STANDING: SALVUCCI
Even before the expectation of privacy rationale was adopted as the standard for determin-
ing one's capacity to challenge a search, the automatic standing rule established in Jones had a
dim future. In Jones, as described earlier, the Court identified two reasons for creating
"automatic standing" for those charged with possessory offenses: the dilemma of self-
incrimination and the "vice" of prosecutorial contradiction. 106
The Court weakened the first underpinning of the doctrine when it held in Simmons v.
United States107 that testimony given by a defendant at a pretrial hearing to establish standing
may not be used against him at trial, regardless of his offense. The Court found that peti-
tioner's testimony in Simmons, to the effect that he owned a suitcase and the clothing inside it,
was "[tihe only, or at least the most natural, way in which he could have found standing to ob-
ject to the admission of the suitcase" and was "an integral part of his Fourth Amendment
claim. 1 08 Yet, noted the Court, if petitioner was unsuccessful in suppressing the evidence, the
testimony would probably also play a large role in his conviction. Simmons rejected as "in-
tolerable" the forcing of a defendant to choose between his fourth and fifth amendment
rights.109
103. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. at 368 (emphasis added).
104. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 167-68.
105. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. at 369.
106. See text accompanying notes 35 through 37 supra.
107. 390 U.S. 377, 393 (1968).
108. Id. at 391; see note 213 infra (discussing degree of possessory interest required).
109. 390 U.S. at 394. The defendant was:
obliged either to give up what he believed, with advice of counsel, to be a valid Fourth
Amendment claim or, in legal effect, to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. In these circumstances, we find it intolerable that one constitutional
1981]
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The Court teetered on the edge of abolishing the automatic standing rule in Brown v.
United States.110 Although it found no need to reach the question in Brown, the Court stated
"we do not decide that [the] vice of prosecutorial self-contradiction warrants the continued
survival of Jones's 'automatic standing' now that our decision in Simmons has removed the
danger of coerced self-incrimination."' I II Justice Rehnquist, once again, stood ready to deal
the final blow to the automatic standing rule. In United States v. Salvucci, 112 Justice Rehn-
quist held that Simmons had "eliminated" the self-incrimination dilemma, 113 despite the peti-
tioners' claim that, even after Simmons, pretrial suppression hearing testimony could be used
by the prosecution both to impeach the defendant and to prepare its case. Justice Rehnquist
responded that the impeachment argument "more aptly relates to the proper breadth of the
Simmons privilege" and did not need to be resolved in Salvucci. 114 Addressing the second con-
tention, he noted that the prosecutor could obtain helpful information during any suppression
hearing, whether it involved a possessory or nonpossessory offense; therefore, maintaining
automatic standing as a special rule merely to protect defendants charged with a possessory of-
fense made no sense. 
115
Justice Rehnquist further held that, although the self-incrimination rationale was the "cor-
nerstone" of Jones, Rakas's adoption of the expectation-of-privacy analysis had also ap-
preciably diminished the "vice of prosecutorial contradiction" that Jones had identified as a
second underpinning for the automatic standing rule. 116 Echoing Rawlings, he stated, "[we]
simply decline to use possession of a seized good as a substitute for a factual finding that the
owner of the good had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched." 117 Thus, a
prosecutor can, without contradiction, assert that the defendant does not have "standing" to
contest a search resulting in the seizure of his property and at the same time contend at trial
that the defendant owns that property. 118
right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another.
110. 411 U.S. 223, 228 (1973) (no automatic standing because case did not depend on possession of
seized evidence at time of alleged fourth amendment violation).
S111. Id. at 229.
112. 100 S. Ct. 2547 (1980).
113. Id. at 2551.
114. Id. at 2554.
115. Id.
116. See text accompanying notes 35 through 37 supra.
117. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 100 S. Ct. at 2553.
118. Although Justice Rehnquist correctly notes that the automatic standing rule is not consonant with
the Court's stance on the scope of the fourth amendment, a troublesome aspect of Salvucci is its intima-
tion that the defendant's pretrial statements may be used to impeach him at trial. See 100 S. Ct. at 2554
nn.8 & 9. If the Court so holds, it will create the same "intolerable" tension between the fourth and fifth
amendments that the Court identified in Simmons. The defendant could be forced to choose between
testifying at the suppression hearing and testifying during trial.
Whether the Court will in fact permit suppression hearing statements to be used to impeach the defen-
dant at trial is not clear. In Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971), the Court held that
statements by the defendant that were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
could be used to impeach the defendant's trial testimony if the statements were otherwise voluntarily
made. In United States v. Havens, 100 S. Ct. at 1917 (1980), the Court implied that the defendant's
statements to police about evidence that is subsequently suppressed as illegally seized could also be used
to impeach him. In New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979), however, the Court held that testimony
given at a grand jury proceeding pursuant to a grant of immunity could not be used to impeach the defen-
dant at trial. The Court stated:
Testimony given in response to a grant of legislative immunity is the essence of coerced
testimony. In such cases there is no question whether physical or psychological pressures
overrode the defendant's will; the witness is told to talk or face the government's coercive
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III. AN INTERPRETATION OF THE COURT'S STANCE
ON THE SCOPE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
With its decisions in Rakas, Rawlings, and Salvucci, the Court has eliminated the set of
rules that once governed the standing inquiry. Automatic standing is, of course, gone com-
pletely. The other standards- the individual's interest in the property searched, his interest in
the property seized, and whether he was legitimately present on the searched property at the
time of the search-have been downgraded from dispositive rules to mere factors to be con-
sidered in the aggregate when assessing whether a fourth amendment violation has occurred.
Undoubtedly, the Court has substantially reduced the scope of the fourth amendment.
A close examination of the Court's recent decisions, however, reveals that there is still a large
area of fourth amendment protection remaining. The Court has not only retained the old stan-
dards as variables in the expectation of privacy analysis but suggested that additional factors
may be relevant to that inquiry. In his concurring opinion in Rakas, for example, Justice Powell
noted that on previous occasions when the Court was concerned with the reasonableness of a
defendant's privacy expectations, it examined whether he "took normal precautions to main-
tain his privacy-that is, precautions customarily taken by those seeking privacy." 1
9 Citing
Jones, Justice Powell also pointed out that the Court had "looked to the way a person has used
a location to determine whether the Fourth Amendment should protect his expectations of
privacy."120 In Rawlings, Justice Rehnquist paraphrased Justice Powell's factors and added
some of his own in examining the defendant's privacy interest in the searched purse. First, he
noted that Rawlings never had access to the purse prior to his sudden bailment. 121 Second, he
stated that the defendant had no "right to exclude other persons" from the searched area. 122 He
also felt that the precipitous nature of the bailment "hardly support[ed]
sanctions, notably, a conviction for contempt.... Balancing of interests was thought to be
necessary in Harris ... when the attempt to deter unlawful police conduct collided with the
need to prevent perjury. Here, by contrast, we deal with the constitutional privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination in its most pristine form. Balancing, therefore, is not simply
unnecessary. It is- impermissible.
Id. at 459.
It has been suggested that the defendant facing the choice between testifying at a suppression hearing and
at a trial more closely resembles the defendant in Portash than the defendant in Harris. See 3 W. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 53 (Supp. 1978) [hereinafter cited as 3
LAFAVE]. In the fourth amendment Portash situation, the defendant must talk, and perhaps incriminate
himself, in order to protect the fourth amendment rights to which he is entitled. The defendant in a fifth
amendment Harris situation, however, does not have to talk in order to receive a constitutional benefit and,
in fact, is constitutionally protected from punishment for remaining silent. In the first case, the State is coer-
cing, before trial, the generation of possibly incriminating information; in the latter case the State is explicit-
ly required to prove that the confession is voluntary before it can use the confession to impeach.
If the impeachment issue is resolved in the manner suggested by Portash, there is little justification for
maintaining the automatic standing rule after Simmons and Rakas. If instead, the Court relies on Harris
in deciding this issue, Salvucci will have placed those charged with possessory offenses on the same
"horns" that existed before Jones (unless, as discussed in the text accompanying note 171 infra, they have
a right to exclude others from the searched property and do not need to show a possessory interest in the
seized item to establish "standing").
119. 439 U.S. at 152 (Powell, J., concurring).
120. Id. at 153.
121. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 100 S. Ct. at 2561. Justice Rehnquist contrasted this bailment with the
"bailment" in Jones, in which the "bailee" (Jones) essentially took control of the apartment containing his
property.
122. Id. Justice Rehnquist cited Rakas's description of Jones and Katz to support this point, see text ac-
companying notes 78 through 80 supra, and noted that one of Cox's friends had previously "rummaged"
through her purse./d.
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a reasonable inference that petitioner took normal precautions to maintain his privacy." 123
Finally, he pointed out that the defendant admitted to having no subjective expectation of
privacy in the purse. 124
From Rakas and Rawlings, then, it is possible to extract at least four indicia of privacy, sup-
plementing those existing before Rakas, that the Court will consider: the individual's authority
to exclude others from the searched area, his previous access to and use of the area, his at-
tempts to maintain privacy, and his subjective expectation of privacy. The first two factors are
so closely tied to the issue of whether the individual has a sufficient interest in the searched
area that they, along with the legitimate presence standard, will be discussed under the
heading: Interest in the Searched Premises. The latter two factors, although also related to this
issue, present special problems and will be treated separately. Finally, the issue of to what ex-
tent, if any, a possessory interest in the seized item independently confers a fourth amendment
right will be discussed.
A. INTEREST IN THE SEARCHED PREMISES
Prior to Rakas, Rawlings, and Salvucci, it was possible for a person with no privacy interest
in the area subjected to a search to contest that search. 125 Under the Court's current inter-
pretation of the fourth amendment, a person cannot challenge the legality of governmental
intrusion into any area in which he does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy. The
Court has suggested at least three ways that an individual might be able to establish the re-
quisite relationship with the searched area. 126
1. The Right to Exclude
Ownership of the searched area remains the single most important factor in establishing the
degree of privacy interest necessary to sustain a fourth amendment objection. As Justice Powell
stated in Rakas, "property rights reflect society's explicit recognition of a person's authority to
act as he wishes in certain areas, and therefore should be considered in determining whether an
individual's expectations of privacy are reasonable." 127 Justice Rehnquist subtly qualified this
statement, however, with his comment in the majority opinion in Rakas that "[o]ne of the main
rights attaching to property is the right to exclude others and one who owns or lawfully possesses
or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of this
right to exclude." 128 Thus, according to Justice Rehnquist, a legitimate expectation of privacy is
not conferred by the property interestperse, but by the associated authority to bar others' access
to the property. Although Justice Rehnquist noted that an owner of property generally possesses
such authority, 129 he also indicated that there may be circumstances where the owner waives his
right to exclude others. 
130
123. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 100 S. Ct at 2561. Justice Rehnquist cited Katz and United States v. Chad-
wick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) at this point; see text accompanying notes 176 through 185 infra.
124. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 100 S. Ct. at 2561. At Rawlings's suppression hearing, he answered "No,
sir" to the following questions: "Did you feel that Vanessa Cox's purse would be free from the intrusion
of the officers as you sat there? When you put the pills in her purse, did you feel that they would be free
from governmental intrusion?" Id. at n.3.
125. For example, before Rakas, neither a person with a property interest in the item seized nor a per-
son charged with a possessory offense needed to prove such an interest in order to have "standing." See
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 264 (1960).
126. A fourth way might be to make a valid bailment of property to a third person. See text accompa-
nying notes 200 through 206 infra.
127. 439 U.S. at 153 (Powell, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 143-44 n.12 (citation omitted).
129. Justice Rehnquist reaffirmed Alderman on this point. Id.
130. Id. He added that a homeowner might not be able to establish a legitimate expectation of
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The majority opinion in Rakas indicated that nonowners may also possess a right to exclude
sufficient to afford them fourth amendment protection, although the boundaries of this right
are not easily discerned. 131 In explaining why the defendants in Jones and Katz "could
legitimately expect privacy in the areas which were the subject of the search and seizure" while
the Rakas defendants could not, Justice Rehnquist described the facts in those cases in terms
of the right to exclude: "Except with respect to his friend, Jones had complete dominion and
control over the apartment and could exclude others from it. Likewise ... Katz [could] ex-
clude all others .... ,,132
It could be argued that except with respect to the owner of the searched car, the Rakas
defendants had complete dominion and control over the car and could exclude others from it.
Practically, however, the Rakas defendants lacked the same degree of "dominion and control"
that Jones and Katz possessed, because their authority was directly superseded by the owner's.
In Jones, the apartment owner left the apartment for five days; in Katz, there was no com-
peting "owner." In Rakas, of course, the owner was actually present at the time of the search
and apparently had not offered to share her possessory interest with her passengers.
133
A narrow reading of Rakas would confine the fourth amendment right to exclude others to
situations in which the nonowner has complete control over the premises, either actually (as in
Katz) or constructively (as in Jones).' 34 Such an approach, of course, fails to recognize that,
more often than not, control of a given place is shared between two or more people who still
expect privacy with respect to the rest of the world. Surely this fact is one of the "understand-
ings ... recognized and permitted by society" to which Justice Rehnquist refers in Rakas. 135
One must go beyond reliance on Jones and Katz to develop a conceptual model of the right to
exclude that conforms with reality.
In his Rakas dissent, Justice White, perhaps unwittingly, suggested such a model-the
jurisprudence of third party consent searches. After referring to the Court's decisions regard-
ing the capacity of one person to consent to a search of property he shares with another, he
concluded that "the scope of the authority sufficient to grant a valid consent can hardly be
broader than the contours of protected privacy."1 36 This comment helps delineate the bound-
aries of an individual's legitimate expectation of privacy, insofar as that expectation is depend-
ent on a right to exclude others. If, for purposes of the fourth amendment, an individual has
the right to admit others into a particular location, he should also possess a constitutionally
significant right to exclude others from that property. After all, these rights are but converse
privacy "with respect to particular items located on the premises," citing cases in which police were able to
see the "homeowner's" property from a lawful vantage point. See text accompanying notes 190 through
196 infra. An absentee owner, such as a landlord, may also lose this right to exclude. But see notes 145
through 146 infra, and accompanying text.
131. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 149.
132. Id. (emphasis added).
133. In his dissent, Justice White noted that this fact had not been actually established at the suppres-
sion hearing. He stated:
So far as we know, the owner of the automobile in question might have expressly granted or
intended to grant exactly such an interest. Apparently not contemplating today's radical
change in the law, petitioners did not know at the suppression hearing that the precise form
of the invitation extended by the owner to the petitioners would be dispositive of their
rights against governmental intrusion.
Id. at 167 n. 19 (White, J., dissenting).
134. Justice Rehnquist emphasized in Rakas that "[a]t the time of the search, Jones was the only occu-
pant of the apartment because the lessee was away for a period of several days." Id. at 141.
135. Id. at 143 n.12.
136. Id. at 163. Justice White cited Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969) and United States v. Matlock,
415 U.S. 164 (1974).
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aspects of the same phenomenon -the effort to regulate one's privacy.
The decisions evaluating a person's capacity to give a valid third party consent are often
phrased in terms of the person's degree of control over the premises that are searched pursuant
to the consent. The seminal Supreme Court decision in United States v. Matlock137 found con-
sent to be valid if the third party "possesse[s] common authority over or other sufficient rela-
tionship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected."'1 38 The Court further explained:
The authority which justifies the third-party consent does not rest upon the law
of property, with its attendant historical and legal refinements... but rests rather
on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control
for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-
inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the
others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common
area to be searched. 139
Interpreting this language, lower courts have held that spouses, 140 lessees, 141 co-tenants, 142
and bailees 143 can usually consent to searches of property they occupy or use. Of course, in
consent cases, the central issue is not the person's "classification" but his degree of joint access
to or control over the searched premises. Thus, a co-tenant who has never used the searched
area, even if it is within a house he inhabits, may not have the capacity to consent to the
search. 144 By the same token, a landlord or bailor, individuals who normally cannot give a
valid consent to a search of property they own but do not occupy, 145 may still be able to per-
mit entrance to those areas over which they maintain a degree of control. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that a landlord stores property in the attic of premises he leases. Although generally he has
no capacity to consent to a search of the leased house as a whole, it is usually held that he does
have such a capacity with respect to an area over which he retains some authority.146 Or
137. 415 U.S. 164 (1974) (co-occupant of bedroom had sufficient authority to consent to search of that
room and seizure of money stolen from third party by other occupant).
138. Id. at 171.
139. Id. at 171 n.7.
140. See, e.g., United States v. Patterson, 554 F.2d 852, 854 (8th Cir. 1977); Yuma County Attorney v.
McGuire, 111 Ariz. 437, 438, 532 P.2d 157, 158 (1975); Burkham v. State, 538 P.2d 1121, 1123 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1975). In Mattock itself, a woman co-habiting with defendant out of wedlock was held to
have the capacity to give consent. See note 137 supra.
141. See United States v. Green, 523 F.2d 968, 971 (9th Cir. 1975); State v. Reagan, 35 N.C. App. 140,
142-43, 240 S.E.2d 805, 807-08 (1978).
142. See United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476, 479-80 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072
(1978); State v. Wyatt, 327 So. 2d 401, 404 (La. 1976).
143. See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969) (bailee of duffel bag who kept some property in
separate compartment of bag could consent to search of other compartments); United States v. Eldridge,
302 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1962) (person given car and keys to trunk by owner for purpose of driving
around town could consent to search of trunk, excluding anything in car that was "covered over or con-
cealed in a package or wrapper").
144. See Gov't of Canal Zone v. Furukawa, 361 F. Supp. 194, 198 (D.C.Z. 1973) (co-tenant of barracks
could not consent to search of defendant's dresser).
145. See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 488 (1964) (hotel clerk could not consent to search of
guest's room); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961) (landlord who could enter premises
occupied by tenant to "view waste" could not consent to search of premises for illegal distillery)
People v. Smith, 67 Cal. App. 3d 638, 647, 136 Cal. Rptr. 764, 768 (1977) (bailor of airplane could not
consent to search of plane while bailee has control of it).
146. See United States v. Cook, 530 F.2d 145, 149 (7th Cir.) (landlady who had reserved the right to
store grain in tenant's poultry house, but had never exercised it, could consent to search of latter), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 909 (1976); United States v. Campanile, 516 F.2d 288, 292 (2d Cir. 1975) (landlord could
consent to search of trash receptacles used by all tenants); Commonwealth v. Latshaw, 242 Pa. Super.
[Vol. 18:387
HeinOnline  -- 18 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 402 1980-1981
CAPACITY TO CONTEST A SEARCH AND SEIZURE
suppose a car owner bails his car to a friend, asking him to return it to him in a few hours. The
owner retains his capacity to consent to a search of its contents. 147 If, however, he in effect
abandons it to the bailee for several months, he may lose that capacity. 148 Similarly, while a
guest generally cannot consent to a search of a house that he occupies, 149 a "guest" who has
considerable authority over the house may be treated differently.150 In circumstances where
the individual has a right to consent, he should also have a right to exclude sufficient to confer
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched.151
The "right to consent and exclude" model can be used to explain most of the Court's deci-
sions concerning the fourth amendment "standing" of nonowners. Jones, as bailee-occupant
of his friend's apartment; Katz as the sole occupant of the phone booth; and DeForte, as the
"co-tenant" of the union office, all possessed a right to consent to the searches that took
233, 363 A.2d 1246, 1247 (1976) (landlady could consent to search of barn jointly used with licensee),
affd, 481 Pa. 298, 392 A.2d 1301 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 931 (1979).
147. Cf. United States v. Carter, 569 F.2d 801, 804 (4th Cir. 1977) (truck owner's consent to search of
truck being used by his employee held valid), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 973 (1978). The court noted that the
owner's "dominion over the vehicle is underscored by his ability to designate its use and users." Id.
148. Cf. notes 186 through 188 infra, and accompanying text.
149. United States v. Harris, 534 F.2d 95, 97 (7th Cir. 1976) (guest who knew owner of apartment for
only three weeks and did not possess key to premises did not share common authority over premises
necessary to validly consent to warrantless search). Note, however, that a guest presumably could consent
to a search of his own belongings.
150. United States v. Turbyfill, 525 F.2d 57, 59 (8th Cir. 1975) (occupant of indefinite duration and
with unlimited access to house had authority to invite police in to search premises); Morrison v. State, 508
S.W.2d 827, 828-29 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (guest's consent to search of appellant's apartment lawful
because consenter had permission to use apartment during appellant's absence).
151. There are potentially two confusing issues connected with third party consent cases. The first is the
so-called "apparent authority doctrine," which holds that consent is valid when given by any individual
whom police reasonably believe has sufficient authority in the premises to consent to its search. Although
this doctrine appears to be easily manipulable by the police, some jurisdictions have adopted it as a suffi-
cient determinant of a party's capacity to give consent. See People v. Superior Court, 77 Cal. App. 3d 69,
80, 143 Cal. Rptr. 382, 388 (1978) (police reasonably believed that manager who unlocked shed had
authority to consent to its earch), rev'd on other grounds, 25 Cal. 3d 67, 157 Cal. Rptr. 716 (1979); State
v. Drake, 343 So. 2d 1336, 1338 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (agricultural inspector reasonably believed that
driver of stopped truck had authority to consent to search of back pack on truck). See also MODEL CODE
OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 55240.2 (Proposed Official Draft, 1957). The Supreme Court has
not addressed the validity of the apparent authority doctrine. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164,
177 n. 14 (1974). To the extent this doctrine confers a capacity to consent on those who do not have actual
joint access to or control over the searched area, it should not govern the analysis set forth here. It ob-
viously is not bottomed on the privacy expectations of the defendant but rather on the reasonableness of
the policeman's beliefs, which are not necessarily congruent with one's legitimate expectations of privacy.
A second issue that could prove confusing is the frequent use of expectation-of-privacy language in
consent search cases. See State v. Taggart, 14 Or. App. 408, 417, 512 P.2d 1359, 1364 (1973) ("Whatever
subjective expectation of privacy defendant may have had was not objectively reasonable under the cir-
cumstances."). In this context, when a court says a defendant has no expectation of privacy in a given
area, it is not saying that the individual should not receive any fourth amendment protection under
Rakas. If it were, the court could technically never reach the consent issue because the defendant would
not have the capacity to bring it up. Rather, the court is referring to the fact that, to the extent the defen-
dant shares his property with someone else, his expectation of privacy is diminished, and his claim that
the consent of that person was invalid will be less likely to succeed. To equate the two concepts would
make it impossible to contest the voluntariness of a search. Suppose, for example, that the police beats
the defendant's spouse until she gives in and "consents" to a search. If the defendant is found to have a
lessened expectation of privacy in his house because he shares it with his wife, and this fact prevents him
from asserting a fourth amendment claim, his own fourth amendment rights have been flagrantly
violated by the police with impunity. For an example of this erroneous reasoning, see note 239 infra
(discussing State v. List, 166 N.J. Super. 368, 399 A.2d 1040 (1979)).
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took place. All were afforded fourth amendment protection. The Rakas defendants, as tem-
porary guests in a car, and Rawlings, who had no previous access to the purse, lacked the
capacity to consent. They were denied fourth amendment protection. In these cases, the
defendants' ability to assert the protection of the fourth amendment can be correlated with
their "right to consent and exclude."
2. Previous Access
The "right to consent and exclude" model noted above should not be considered the ex-
clusive means of establishing a legitimate expectation of privacy. Nor is it contended that this
model explains all of the Court's decisions that effect the scope of the fourth amendment. In
particular, the Court's grant of standing in United States v. Jeffers 152 suggests an additional
manner in which a person with no property interest in the searched premises may establish a
constitutionally sufficient privacy interest in that area.
Jeffers's federal narcotics conviction was based on drugs seized from a hotel room rented by
two of his aunts. Jeffers did not pay rent for the room but possessed its key and apparently en-
joyed unlimited access to it. 153 Because Jeffers did not have a common law property interest in
the room and was not present at the time of the search, the Government contended that he had
no standing to contest the seizure. But the Court determined that the search and subsequent
seizure were "bound together by one sole purpose -to locate and seize the narcotics of respon-
dent."1 54 The majority found that Jeffers's standing would be "unquestionabl[e] ... unless the
contraband nature of the narcotics seized precluded his assertion, for purposes of the exclu-
sionary rule, of a property interest therein."' 55 The Court held, however, that the federal
statute declaring that no property rights existed in contraband property meant only that such
contraband could not be returned to the possessor as his chattel. Thus, "[i]t being his proper-
ty, for purpose of the exclusionary rule, he was entitled on motion to have it suppressed as
evidence on [sic] his trial."
156
While some lower courts understood this language to mean that Jeffers's standing was based
purely on his property interest in the seized narcotics, 157 a majority of the present Supreme
Court held, in Rakas, that "[s]tanding in Jeffers was based on Jeffers's possessory interest in
both the premises searched and the property seized." 158 Clearly, Jeffers's interest in the
premises cannot be justified on the right-to-exclude grounds alone, even if interpreted in the
manner suggested below. The fact that Jeffers possessed a key to the searched hotel room does
not mean that his aunts - who paid for the room - authorized him to "permit [ilts inspection
in his own right" or "assumed the risk" that he might allow their room to be searched, to use
Matlock's terminology. 159 In the usual case, neither the individual conferring the key nor the
person receiving it would assume that that act by itself would confer upon the donee the right
to let any of his acquaintances, let alone the police, enter the donor's premises. Only if the
donor also permitted the donee to live in the premises, as happened in Jones, could it be said
that the donor assumed the risk that the donee might consent to a search of his property.
152. 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
153. Id. at 50.
154. Id. at 52.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 54.
157. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 300 F. Supp. 1285, 1287 (D.N.H. 1969)(standing based on
possessory interest in suitcase and attache case seized from third party); United States v. Birrell, 242 F.
Supp. 191, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)(standing where defendant's business records seized from his attorney).
158. 439 U.S. at 136.
159. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
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Because Rakas implicitly affirmed Jeffers,160 how is the result in that case to be explained if
not on the basis of the right to consent and exclude? There are two aspects of Jeffers that dif-
ferentiate it from Rakas and Rawlings, the cases that best reflect the situations which the
Court believes do not implicate the fourth amendment. First, Jeffers could enter the searched
area "at will," according to the Court's opinion. Second Jeffers admitted ownership of the
seized property. While the degree of the defendant's access to the car prior to the search in
Rakas is unclear, 161 there is no question that they disclaimed any possessory interest in the
seized item. In Rawlings, the defendant claimed a possessory interest, but clearly had no
previous access to the purse. These differences suggest that, if Jeffers is to maintain any validi-
ty, the Court will permit a defendant to contest a search and seizure if he can show previous,
continuing access to the searched area and a possessory interest in the seized item.
It is probable that unless the defendant can show access to the premises akin to that enjoyed
by Jeffers, plus a possessory interest in the item seized from those premises, the present Court
will not view favorably his fourth amendment claim, at least under the Jeffers rationale. 162 In
light of the Court's seeming failure to distinguish sufficiently between privacy expectations
with respect to others and privacy expectations with respect to the government, 163 it would
probably hold that a person with only occasional access to particular premises should not be
able to expect any personal privacy there. But suppose that a person who can show only
limited access to certain premises is present at the time of an illegal entry onto them and that
the entry results in the seizure of his property. If used against him, would he have the capacity
to challenge the search that led to the seizure?
3. Legitimate Presence
It is arguable that if the fourth amendment "protects people, not places," an individual's
personal privacy is infringed upon when the police unexpectedly enter a place he legitimately
occupies, whether he owns that place or not. In Rakas, the Court declared that the petitioners
could not claim the protection of the fourth amendment because their presence on the
searched premises alone could not sustain a legitimate expectation of privacy. Yet because the
Rakas defendants did not own the property seized, it would still seem to be an open question
whether legitimate presence, in addition to possessory interest in the item seized, would be suf-
ficient for fourth amendment purposes. This impression is bolstered by Justice Rehnquist's
statement in Rakas that, while persons who are casual visitors in a house may no longer be
able to contest a search of the house simply because they are legitimately present at the time of
the search, "this is not to say that such visitors could not contest the lawfulness of the seizure
of evidence or the search if their own property were seized during the search." 164
Rawlings did nothing to contradict this perception. In Rawlings, the defendant was
legitimately in the house that was searched and owned the drugs that were seized. The issue in
that case, however, was whether the defendant had a privacy interest in the purse, not in the
160. "We can think of no decided cases of this Court that would have come out differently had we con-
cluded, as we do now, that the type of standing requirement discussed in Jones and reaffirmed today is
more properly subsumed under substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine." Id. at 139.
161. One of the petitioners was the former husband of the car owner and driver and had been with her
when she had purchased it. Thus, it is likely that he at one time had access to it. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
at 128, 167 n.20.
162. As a practical matter, most individuals with unlimited access to a given area will possess a right to
consent and exclude as defined here. Moreover, a defendant who can show that the property was properly
bailed to a third party might be able to assert a fourth amendment claim, even if he has incomplete access.
See text accompanying notes 200 through 206 infra.
163. See text accompanying notes 103 through 105 supra.
164. Rakas v. Illinois 439 U.S. at 142 n.ll.
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house. His relationship to the house was irrelevant to the finding in that case. Had the issue
been whether he could have contested an illegal entry of the house, an issue that did not arise
because the entry was pursuant to a valid arrest warrant, the conclusion in Rawlings would
presumably have been different.
Professor LaFave has suggested that because Rakas involved a search after a lawful stop of
the car, its holding does not necessarily apply to situations in which a car is unlawfully stop-
ped. 165 Under such circumstances, he argues, anyone legitimately present in the car should be
able to contest not only the stopping but the "fruits" of that stopping, including the seizure of
any property found in the car. He extends this reasoning to illegal entries of houses. To use his
example:
If the police, without required notice or without probable cause or without a re-
quired search warrant, burst into B' s home and disrupt a dinner party at which A
is present as a guest, then certainly A should be deemed to have standing to ob-
ject -just as passengers in a car may object to its illegal stopping. Dinner guest A
has had his freedom, privacy and solitude intruded upon by the police and thus
has standing to object to that encroachment upon his rights, even if it led to the
discovery of evidence in B's basement, a place A (in Justice Rehnquist's language)
'has never seen, or been permitted to visit." 66
Professor LaFave's analysis is ingenious, but it probably would not be endorsed in its totali-
ty by a majority of the Court as he claims. 167 Six Justices have indicated that they do not
believe that "mere legitimate presence is enough to create a Fourth Amendment right."
1 68
Given its multi-factor approach, the Court would not consider the invasion of a person's
privacy that occurs when police illegally enter a home he is visiting sufficient, in itself, to con-
fer a legitimate expectation of privacy. Instead, it seems more likely that the Court would re-
quire casual visitors and passengers to base their fourth amendment claim on a seizure of their
own property or of property placed in an area from which they have a right to exclude
others. 169 Thus, using LaFave's example, if the police burst into B's home, go to the basement
that A has never seen and seize items that belong to B, the present Court would probably hold
that A has not suffered a constitutional deprivation. But if, after an illegal entry, the police
seize property belonging to A that A has placed on B's table or in B's purse, or seize any pro-
perty from A's purse or person, there is considerably greater chance, based on the Court's cur-
rent stance, that it would accord fourth amendment protection to A.
These points highlight the difference between the defendant who bases his fourth amend-
ment claim on a right to exclude others from an area the police illegally enter and the defen-
dant who can show only unlimited access to or legitimate presence in the area. The first defen-
dant need not prove a possessory interest in the seized item or its location within the area in
order to contest the police action leading to its seizure, whereas the second defendant must do
so. Alderman held that a person can contest the seizure of a conversation to which he is not
165. 3 LAFAVE, supra note 118, at 58-60.
166. Id. at 59-60.
167. LaFave notes that both Justice Powell's concurring opinion (joined by Chief Justice Burger) and
Justice White's dissenting opinion (joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens) recognize that
Rakas did not involve the constitutionality of the stop of the car in that case, but only decided the defen-
dants' standing to contest the search after the car was stopped. He argues that two-thirds of the Court
might therefore decide in his favor. Id. at 60.
168. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 151 (Powell, J., concurring).
169. This may be a quibbling distinction. It is probable that in most cases the property the state seeks to
use against a "visitor" defendant belongs to that defendant.
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a party when that conversation takes place in his home. 170 Unless the Court is willing to
recognize a difference between a conversation and other types of "property" for purposes of
the fourth amendment, Alderman stands for the proposition that a home owner -or anyone
with a similar right to exclude 171 -should be able to contest the seizure of any property
resulting from an illegal entry of that home. 172 The person who cannot show that he possessed
such a right with respect to the entered area cannot benefit from the Alderman rationale and
needs to show additional indicia of privacy. 1
73
The above discussion is based on the assumption that the police have illegally entered the
searched premises. Of course, if the police enter a house lawfully, no one, including the owner
of that house, may bottom a fourth amendment claim on his privacy interest in the house. As
the next section points out, however, it is still possible to contest the search of items within the
house; the principles discussed above should apply whether the area illegally entered is a home
or something much smaller.
B. REASONABLE PRECAUTIONS
Both Justice Powell and Justice Rehnquist suggested that the present Court will consider the
precautions an individual has taken to maintain his privacy in assessing whether that in-
dividual merits fourth amendment protection. 174 If such precautions are "reasonable" -that
is, "[if they are] customarily taken by those seeking privacy"' 175 - they may create a legitimate
expectation of privacy. As will be argued below, however, relying too heavily on such an
analysis would have undesirable consequences to the extent it requires individuals to take cer-
tain steps before they can expect privacy. Moreover, such reliance is, for the most part, un-
necessary if one accepts the precept that a right to exclude others from a given area generally
confers a legitimate expectation of privacy in that area.
For example, one of the two cases that both Justices Powell and Rehnquist cite to illustrate
the reasonable precautions principle is Katz v. United States. 176 In Katz, it will be remembered,
the Court found that an individual who shuts the door of a phone booth and pays the toll to
make a call is entitled to an expectation that the call will be private. Thus, paying for the
privilege of isolation from the rest of the world, as occurs when one uses a phone booth or a
taxicab, 177 may constitute a "reasonable" precaution to maintain one's privacy. Yet, as Rakas
made clear, 178 Katz can best be explained in terms of the right-to-exclude rationale.
Similarly, the Court's holding in the second case cited by Justices Powell and Rehnquist,
United States v. Chadwick, 179 is more reasonably based on the right to exclude rationale.
Chadwick involved the validity of a warrantless search of a locked footlocker seized from a
car. Because Chadwick was decided before Rakas and, like Katz, focused on whether
170. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 176-77; see text accompanying note 60 supra.
171. There is no reason why a nonowner who has sufficient control over a particular area to permit its
search should not also be able to keep any property there and legitimately expect it to remain free from
government intrusion. For example, a lessee, whose right of control is as great as an owner's during the
period of the lease, J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 202-03 (2d ed. 1975), should have this
legitimate expectation.
172. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. at 176-77.
173. Id.
174. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 149 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.); id. at 152 (Powell, J., concurring).
175. Id. at 152. (Powell, J., concurring).
176. 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967), cited in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 149, 152.
177. In Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960), the Court apparently assumed that the peti-
tioner -who had hired a cab, sat in the back seat and put the seized package on the floor when the police
stopped the car-had standing to contest the search and seizure.
178. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 149; see text accompanying notes 129 through 134 supra.
179. 433 U.S. 1 (1977), cited in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 148, 153.
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a "search" occurred when the police opened the footlocker, it did not directly address the issue
of whether the individuals who owned the footlocker had a right to contest the search. But by
combining these two inquiries, Rakas made the Chadwick holding directly relevant to the issue
being discussed here. In supporting its holding that once the footlocker was immobilized,
police should have obtained a warrant for its search, the Court stated:
By placing personal effects inside a double locked footlocker, respondents
manifested an expectation that the contents would remain free from public ex-
amination. No less than one who locks the doors of his home against intruders,
one who safeguards his personal possessions in this manner is due the protection
of the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause. 180
Admittedly, this language focuses on the fact that the footlocker was locked, suggesting
that this precaution impressed the Court. In Arkansas v. Sanders, however, the Court applied
Chadwick to invalidate the warrantless search of an unlocked suitcase seized under similar cir-
cumstances. The Sanders 81 opinion tacitly acknowledged that the end result of applying a
reasonable-precautions analysis in the manner implied by Chadwick would be a society in
which citizens could not expect privacy from unreasonable government intrusion unless they
carried their effects in opaque, locked containers. 182 Justice Blackmun's dissent in Sanders
queried whether the majority's decision would require a warrant to search items such as an
"orange crate," a "lunch bucket," and a "paper bag." He suggested that, at some point, "[t]he
lines that will be drawn will not make sense in terms of the policies of the Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments." 183 Yet the majority in Sanders hinted that it might include these types
of containers within the ambit of fourth amendment protection. 184
Ironically, Justice Blackmun's fellow dissenter in Sanders, Justice Rehnquist, suggested the
appropriate approach to analyzing searches of containers when he implied, in Rawlings, that
one can possess a legitimate expectation of privacy in a purse based merely on one's right to ex-
clude others from it. 185 It would seem that if a person uses a paper bag to hold his belongings,
he should be accorded the same fourth amendment protection he would have in a purse or
suitcase.
Reliance on the "right to consent and exclude" model does not, however, render the
reasonable-precautions analysis totally irrelevant to the fourth amendment inquiry. There are
three situations in which one's capacity to contest a search or seizure may be affected by a
failure to take reasonable precautions to maintain one's privacy.
1. Abandonment
The first situation triggering reasonable-precautions analysis is obvious and needs limited
attention here. If the property-be it a gun, a suitcase, a car or a house-is, or appears to be,
180. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at !1.
181. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) (expectation of privacy associated with personal luggage
not diminished simply because officers removed luggage from lawfully stopped vehicle).
182. Id. at 772 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
183. Id.
184. The majority was careful to limit its decision to "personal luggage." Id. at 764-65 n.13. But the
only examples the Court could give of containers that should not be accorded the full protection of the
fourth amendment were those that revealed their contents from their outward appearance (such as a gun
case or an open package).Id. A paper bag is just as capable of hiding its contents from direct viewing by
the public as an unlocked suitcase. As discussed below, one's legitimate expectations of privacy should
not depend on the size or usual use of the container, but rather its location and, as suggested by Sanders,
the degree to which it reveals its contents.
185. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 100 S. Ct. at 2561.
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abandoned, the owner of that property should not be permitted to assert a fourth amendment
claim when it or something in it is seized by the police. The Supreme Court initially addressed
this problem with its "open fields" doctrine, which permitted the warrantless seizure of
anything "abandoned" in the open fields outside the curtilage of a person's home. 186 Similarly,
a gun thrown in a vacant lot 187 should not be accorded the same degree of protection as a gun
kept in a person's home or car, or near one's person. Unless the item is kept where a
reasonable observer would conclude its owner intends to protect it from intrusion, the owner
cannot be said to have exercised reasonable precautions to maintain its privacy. 188
2. Exposure
The reasonable-precautions analysis may also be triggered when an object is "exposed" to
the public. Could it not be applied when, instead of throwing his gun in a field, the owner
leaves it in the front seat of his car, where it is visible to everyone; or when a homeowner keeps
drugs in a transparent vial which can be viewed through his house window from the street; or
when a woman leaves her purse open beside her where any curious passerby can see contra-
band inside? Should any of these people be accorded a legitimate expectation of privacy or
have they, in effect, abandoned their property?
In Katz, the Court stated that "what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his
own home or office, is not a subject of fourth amendment protection." 189 This language in-
dicates that there may be circumstances in which a person may not be able to assert a fourth
amendment claim because he did not take reasonable precautions to prevent direct viewing of
his property by the public. As argued below, however, this principle should not, as a practical
matter, preclude a person from contesting police intrusion onto his property. For the same
reason that a person should not be required to lock up his property in order to be able to con-
test unreasonable governmental intrusion, a person should not have to cover up items in his
car, curtain his windows, or use only tightly fastened receptacles to carry his effects in order to
deserve a legitimate expectation of privacy.
186. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (no fourth amendment protection for illegally
distilled whisky dropped in open field by defendant during pursuit by revenue officers); see State v.
Caldwell, 20 Ariz. App. 331, 335, 512 P.2d 863, 867 (1973) (boxes containing marijuana discovered in
area where general public apt to wander); Bedell v. State, 257 Ark. 895, 898, 521 S.W.2d 200, 201 (1975)
(no fourth amendment protection for marijuana found on farm owned by defendant). Generally it is re-
quired that the item be directly visible from a place in which the police have a right to be, although
evidence found after a trespass has been held admissible. See Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 25 (10th
Cir. 1956) (illegal still found in hidden cave on defendant's property admissible).
Nevertheless, under Katz, activities in an open field might be subject to fourth amendment protection if
the parties reasonably believe that such activities will remain private. See Hendricks, Eavesdropping,
Wiretapping and the Law of Search and Seizure- Some Implications of the Katz Decision, 9 A=uZ. L.
REv. 428, 435 (1968); cf. State v. Stanton, 7 Or. App. 286, 294-96, 490 P.2d 1274, 1278-79 (1971) (ad-
dressing effect of Katz on open field doctrine; no reasonable expectation of privacy for marijuana in open
field; but dictum suggests valid expectation may exist in some open field cases).
187. See Smith v. United States, 292 A.2d 150, 151 (D.C. App. 1972) (defendant threw revolver away
when chased by police officer; defendant's claim that he intended to retrieve it, even if true, does not
change fact of abandonment).
188. See, e.g., Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960) (search of wastebasket in defendant's hotel
room valid after defendant, having been arrested there, packed his bags, checked out of hotel, and left with
police); United States v. Gulledge, 469 F.2d 713, 715-16 (5th Cir. 1972) (defendants obtained permission to
keep U-Haul trailer at service station for two to three days; no expectation of privacy in trailer when left
there 10 days); Anderson v. State, 133 Ga. App. 45, 47, 209 S.E.2d 665, 667 (1974) (defendant abandoned
margarine carton when he put it under rock on beach and went into water; nature of container may influence
whether abandonment is found); State v. Aragon, 89 N.M. 91, 94, 547 P.2d 574, 577 (1976) (tin can of
heroin found in open lot in which defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy).
189. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351.
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The issue of when an object is exposed to the public under the Katz doctrine is an extremely
complex one, and cannot be dealt with fully here. 190 Generally, under Katz, if a government
agent can see, hear, or smell something from a place in which he is lawfully present, he has
not conducted a "search" within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 191 By incorporating
Katz's expectation of privacy language into the standing inquiry, Rakas held that an individual
cannot challenge this type of government intrusion. 192
It should be obvious, however, that if the police, subsequent to seeing evidence from a
lawful vantage point, physically intrude into the area that contains the evidence, they may be
conducting a fourth amendment search. All that the owner should surrender by exposing his
property to the public is the ability to challenge its observation by the police; if they act upon
that observation in an unreasonable manner, he should still be able to exclude the evidence ob-
tained. If A leaves a gun visible on the front seat of his car, he cannot claim that the police il-
legally espied it through the car window. If they subsequently break open the car and seize the
gun, however, A should be able to contest the legality of the intrusion because an area from
which he has the right to exclude others has been violated by the government. Whether he
would win on the merits would depend upon whether the police had a search warrant, or
possessed probable cause to believe that the gun was evidence of criminal activity and that it,
or the entire car, would disappear before they could obtain a warrant. 193 The central point is
that Katz does not mean that any time police can see what they think is evidence of criminal
activity from a lawful vantage point their subsequent actions cannot be challenged in court. 194
Houses, and to a lesser extent, cars, are "containers" in which one customarily expects a cer-
tain minimum degree of privacy. Because these areas are intimately associated with one's
private world, 195 a person should be entitled to expect that they will be free from governmen-
tal intrusion, even if the items in them are visible from an area accessible to the public. But
190. See generally I W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 221 et
seq. (1978) [hereinafter cited as I LAFAVE]; Moylan, Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the Great
"Search Incident" Geography Battle, 26 MERCER L. REV. 1047 (1975); Comment, "Plain
View"-Anything But Plain: Coolidge Divides the Lower Courts, 7 Lov. L.A.L. REv. 489 (1974).
191. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 352. See also 1 LAFAVE, supra note 190, at 240.
192. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 148-49.
193. For a discussion of warrantless searches of automobiles, see generally Moylan, The Automobile
Exception: What It Is and What It Is Not-A Rationale in Search of a Clearer Label, 27 MERCER L. REv.
987 (1976).
194. See generally C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
AND CONCEPTS 223 [hereinafter cited as WHITEBREADJ; I LAFAVE, supra note 190, at 244-46. Both sources
quote the following language from Coolidge v. New Hampshire:
Plain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence. This is simp-
ly a corollary of the familiar principle discussed above, that no amount of probable cause
can justify a warrantless search or seizure absent "exigent circumstances." Incontrovertible
testimony of the senses that an incriminating object is on premises belonging to a criminal
suspect may establish the fullest possible measure of probable cause. But even when the ob-
ject is contraband, this Court has repeatedly stated and enforced the basic rule that the
police may not enter and make a warrantless seizure.
403 U.S. 443, 468 (1971).
195. It has been suggested that property concepts should be used to define the minimum content of the
fourth amendment, so as to avoid the possible manipulation of privacy expectations by the government.
Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, 76 MICH. L. REv. 154, 181 (1977). See
also text accompanying notes 206 through 211 infra. The Note suggests that "courts should decide fourth
amendment issues by asking what we are entitled to expect from the government, rather than by asking
what the government will allow us to expect." Id. at 183 (emphasis in original).
Certainly, the homeowner if anyone, is entitled to expect that he will not be intruded upon by the
government. Given the preeminent position of the home in fourth amendment jurisprudence, recently
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should the same protection be afforded the contents of a smaller container -for instance, a
transparent drug vial -that reveals its contents? It is arguable that the size of the container
should not make a difference for fourth amendment purposes. Even if a right to exclude
others is insufficient to confer fourth amendment protection in this situation, these smaller
items will generally be kept in a house, a car, or a coat pocket, all areas where one's expecta-
tions of privacy are high. The fact that police enter these areas lawfully should not act to
diminish that expectation to the point where a search and seizure of anything transparent, or
which otherwise reveals its contents, cannot be contested.
The present Court, however, appears to be leaning toward such a holding. In Rawlings, the
majority opinion implied that the defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the
vial containing his drugs. 196 While the majority in Sanders seemed inclined to extend the
search warrant requirement to most opaque containers, it specifically exempted from full
fourth amendment protection containers which "by their very nature cannot support any
reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward
appearance." 197 The Court cited a kit of burglar tools and a gun case as examples of such con-
tainers. 198 Thus, the Court's apparent rule is that one cannot possess a legitimate expectation
of privacy in containers that somehow reveal what they contain. Unless a person, as a
minimum protection, prevents direct viewing of these items from the premises where they are
situated, police lawfully on those premises will be able to conduct a warrantless search and
seizure without violating the person's expectation of privacy.
As a later section of this article will discuss, however, the fact that a container reveals its
contents should not preclude its owner from contesting a seizure of that item based on his pro-
perty interest, as opposed to his privacy interest, in the seized item. 199
3. Bailments
A final situation in which the reasonable-precautions analysis is appropriate arises when a
person gives his property to someone else for safekeeping. Given Justice Rehnquist's emphasis
on the nature of the bailment in Rawlings,200 this issue is likely to arise frequently. When a
person gives his property to another, even on a very limited basis, he increases the risk that it
will be exposed to others without his knowing it. If A gives B his now familiar gun, for
affirmed by the Court in Payton v. New York, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1379 (1980) (arrest warrant is required to
enter the arrestee's home except in exigent circumstances), the reasonable-precautions analysis should not
prevent the homeowner from asserting a fourth amendment claim based on intrusion into his home. See
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. at 179 n.j 1. For further discussion of Alderman, see text accompa-
nying notes 56 through 60 supra. See also Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511-12 n.4 (1961)
(quoting Judge Frank's description of a man's right to freedom from unreasonable government intrusion
in his home in United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 315-16 (2d Cir. 1951) (dissenting opinion), affd,
343 U.S. 747 (1952)).
By the same token, the owner of a car is entitled to expect that, except for regulatory purposes, the
government will not invade his privacy there. Admitting that the car owner can claim far less privacy than
can the homeowner, see note 81 supra, it is still plausible to argue that the car is worth protecting from en-
croachment. Vehicles are often "a home away from home." Even when used solely for transportation,
they represent a barrier between the owner and the world at large that should be protected.
Finally, of course, the individual's own person is fully protected by the fourth amendment, and items
that he carries with him should require similar protection.
196. See 100 S. Ct. at 2562. Justice Rehnquist stated that if the seized drugs, which were contained in a
jar and a number of smaller vials, had been placed in "plain view," the defendant-owner "could not claim
any legitimate expectation of privacy." Id.
197. Arkansas v. Sanders,442 U.S. at 764-65 n.13.
198. Id.
199. See text accompanying notes 212 through 228 infra.
200. See notes 121 through 124 supra, and accompanying text.
1981]
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example, and tells B to keep it for him, A has surrendered direct control of his property. He
has no way of guaranteeing that B will stick the gun in his wallsafe rather than putting it in the
back seat of his car, or throwing it out the window. Even if A places the gun in a bag before
giving it to B, thus giving himself a more direct right to exclude others from the gun, B will
have access to it and may reveal it to others. Only if A encloses his property in a locked con-
tainer and keeps the key can he be virtually sure that it will remain private.
Yet, once again, such a result would have undesirable constitutional consequences, as well
as defeat the usual purpose of a bailment by denying the bailee use of the object. Conditioning
the reasonableness of the bailor's precautions on his restriction of the bailee's use of, or access
to, the property is an inappropriate limitation on both individuals' freedom. The degree of the
bailee's access is an issue more properly related to his capacity to consent to an intrusion into
the bailor's property than to the bailor's legitimate expectation of privacy. 2 1 To reason other-
wise would be tantamount to saying that no one who shares his property with someone else
can challenge a search resulting in the seizure of that property.
The focus of the reasonable-precautions analysis in the bailment situation, therefore,
should be entirely on the act of bailment itself. There are essentially two requirements to a
valid bailment: delivery by the bailor and intent to possess on the part of the bailee. 202 The
first inquiry should be relatively simple. If the bailor never gives his property to the bailee or
makes an incomplete transfer, or if the bailee receives it under protest, delivery has not taken
place. 203 The more difficult determination will probably be whether the bailee intends to
possess the item in question. Implicit in this requirement is that the bailee know that he is
possessing something and, if that is shown, that he know the nature of what he possesses.
204
Thus, if A puts his property in B's house without B's knowledge, gives B a vial of cocaine but
tells B it is salt, or gives B a suitcase without telling him there is a shotgun and stolen money in-
side, the bailment may fail. 205 A should not have a legitimate expectation that his property
will remain free from governmental intrusion in any of these cases.
Once a bailment is found to be valid, however, A should be entitled to the same expectation
of privacy that B possesses with respect to the area in which he places A's property. If B puts
the property in his house or car, and it is illegally seized from there, A should be able to con-
test the search, as should B. If B abandons the property, however, neither A nor B should
have "standing" to contest the search.
C. SUBJEcTIvE EXPECTATIONS
None of the situations discussed above refers to the individual's personal beliefs about the
privacy of his property. It would certainly be possible for a person with a right to exclude
others from a particular area to have no subjective expectation that the property will remain
free from governmental intrusion. Conversely, someone who can meet none of the criteria set
201. See note 151 supra.
202. See generally R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 209-23 (3d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited
as BROWN]. See also Gutterman, supra note 20, at 119.
203. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 100 S. Ct. at 2560 n.2 (bailee testified she requested bailor to take the
drugs out of her purse); see, e.g., Wamser v. Browning, King Co., 187 N.Y. 87, 79 N.E. 861 (1907)
(garments laid on table in store while owner tried on other clothes and clerk was absent not a bailment);
Lord v. Oklahoma State Fair Ass'n, 95 Okla. 294, 219 P. 213 (1923) (car parked in Association's parking
lot for twenty-five cent fee not bailed to Association); Kuchinsky v. Empire Lounge, 27 Wis. 2d 446, 134
N.W.2d 246 (1965) (coat hung near customer's seat in lounge not bailed to restaurant).
204. BROWN, supra note 202, at 213-14.
205. See Dumlao v. Atlantic Garage, Inc., 259 A.2d 360 (D.C. 1969) (garage not bailee of articles in
trunk it did not know about); Samples v. Geary, 292 S.W. 1066 (Mo. Ct. App. 1927) (no bailment of fur
piece concealed in coat). But see General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Co. v. J.F.D.L., Inc., 148 So.2d 857
(La. Ct. App. 1963) (bailee of automobile liable for items "customarily" left in car).
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out above may firmly believe his property is hidden from everyone, including the police. To
the extent that courts must rely on subjective interpretations, however, there is liable to be a
great degree of disparity between jurisdictions and a concomitant variation in the scope of the
fourth amendment's protection. Accordingly, the principles set out in sections B and C above
adopt, to as great an extent as possible, the objective approach suggested by the Court's use of
the words "legitimate" and "reasonable" when discussing the scope of the fourth amendment.
Aside from avoiding confusion and inefficiency, there is an additional reason for attempt-
ing to make an objective inquiry into whether one has a legitimate expectation of privacy. To
the extent fourth amendment protection is defined subjectively, it can be manipulated, not
just by the defendant, but by the State. At one time Justice Harlbn interpreted the Katz deci-
sion to mean "first, that a person must have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable.' "206
Justice Harlan later rejected the first prong of that test: fourth amendment analysis "must
transcend the search for subjective expectations .... [for] our expectations, and the risks we
assume, are in large part reflections of law that translate into rules the customs and values of
the past and present." 207 Professor Amsterdam put the matter more dramatically seven years
ago when he noted:
An actual, subjective expectation of privacy ... can neither add to, nor can its
absence detract from, an individual's claim to fourth amendment protection. If it
could, the government could diminish each person's subjective expectation of
privacy merely by announcing half-hourly on television that 1984 was being ad-
vanced by a decade and that we were all forthwith being placed under comprehen-
sive electronic surveillance. 208
The facts of Rawlings illustrate the danger involved in permitting a person's own impres-
sions to govern the scope of his fourth amendment right. During the suppression hearing in
that case, the defendant stated that he had not felt Vanessa Cox's purse would be free from in-
trusion by the officers who had entered the house. 209 Yet it is unlikely that anyone would feel
safe from government intrusion when, as was the case in Rawlings, he is surrounded by four
officers and told he cannot leave unless he submits to a body search. It is to be hoped that
Justice Rehnquist's comment that the defendant did not expect any privacy in such a situation
was merely a passing one. 210 Certainly for the reasons suggested here, it should not even be
relevant to the fourth amendment inquiry, much less dispositive of it.211
D. INTEREST IN THE SEIZED ITEM
As earlier parts of this article have made clear, 212 proof of a possessory interest in the seized
evidence, even after Rawlings and Salvucci, is not totally without significance in establishing a
person's capacity to contest a search. If a person can establish a possessory interest, additional
proof of continuing access to or legitimate presence on the searched premises should enable him
206. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
207. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971)(Harlan, J., dissenting).
208. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MmN. L. Rav. 349, 384 (1974), quoted in
1 LAFAVE, supra note 190, at 230.
209. 100 S. Ct. at 2561 n.3.
210. Id. at 2562.
211. The Kentucky state courts, however, relied in part on this admission. Id.
212. See text accompanying notes 152 through 171 supra.
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to claim fourth amendment protection. Here, however, emphasis will be given to what role a
possessory interest in the seized item, 213 by itself, plays in the fourth amendment inquiry.
In his Rawlings dissent, Justice Marshall cited what he called "a long tradition" embodying
the view that an interest in the item seized by the police enables one to contest a search and
seizure. 214 Yet, no decision of the Supreme Court, as interpreted by the present Court, directly
supports this stance. 215 Moreover, with respect to a party's capacity to contest a search, as op-
posed to a seizure, it makes no sense under the Court's current approach to grant fourth
amendment protection purely on the basis of ownership of the seized item. As Justice Rehn-
quist stated in Rawlings, "[h]ad petitioner placed his drugs in plain view, he would still have
owned them, but he could not claim any legitimate expectation of privacy.
'216
This does not mean that ownership of the seized item confers no constitutionally protec-
table interest. In Rawlings, Justice Marshall rightly emphasized that the fourth amendment
speaks of both searches and seizures. 217 A seizure, as defined by the Court in an early deci-
sion, "contemplates a forcible dispossession of the owner.
'218
If the government proceeds unlawfully in the act of dispossessing an owner of property, the
owner should be able to invoke the exclusionary rule. Both Rakas and Rawlings fail to dif-
ferentiate between searches and seizures when rejecting "the notion that 'arcane' concepts of
property law ought to control the ability to claim the protections of the Fourth
213. The degree of "possessory interest" one must show for fourth amendment purposes cannot be
stated with certainty. It would seem, however, that if the item is in the possession of the defendant at the
time of the search, he should have a sufficient possessory interest based on his expectations of privacy. If
the article is not in his possession, he should have to show that his title is equal or superior to that of
everyone else.
Courts have occasionally addressed the issue of whether one can have a fourth amendment possessory
interest in contraband or stolen goods. In United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951), the Court appeared
to establish that one can have a possessory interest in contraband sufficient for fourth amendment pur-
poses when it declared that the illegally possessed narcotics seized in that case were "[the defendant's] pro-
perty, for purposes of the exclusionary rule .. " Id. at 54. It has been argued that a thief should also
have a sufficient possessory interest in property he has stolen because, under the common law rule, as
against everyone but the true owner, he has superior title, and thus his title supercedes that of the police.
Grove, supra note 20, at 170.
214. 100 S. Ct. at 2567 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
215. Justice Marshall cited Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973)(no standing to challenge war-
rantless search because defendant not legitimately on premises and not a possessory offense); Simmons v.
United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389-90 (1968)(testimony given by defendant at pretrial hearing to establish
standing may not be used against him at trial); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968)(union records
suppressed due to warrantless search of "private" office); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261
(1960)(narcotics suppressed due to illegal search of friend's home); and United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S.
48, 52 (1951) (narcotics suppressed due to illegal search of aunts' hotel room).
Rakas, however, promulgated a different interpretation of the issue from that desired by Justice Mar-
shall. The Court explicitly stated that the grant of standing in Jeffers was based on his interest in the
premises as well as in the seized property, Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 136. This, taken with the view ex-
pressed by the Rawlings majority, impliedly overrules the dicta in Jones, Brown, and DeForte to the ef-
fect that a possessory interest in the seized item would be sufficient to establish standing. Simmons, where
the petitioner testified to probable ownership of the seized suitcase at a pretrial hearing, is most ap-
propriately seen as a forerunner of Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 762-65 (1979) (invalidating war-
rantless search of unlocked suitcase), rather than supporting an inference of standing based on a
possessory interest in items seized. In both cases, private sanctity of a suitcase, not the objects in it, was
upheld. See text accompanying notes 181 through 184 supra.
216. 100 S. Ct. at 2562.
217. Id. at 2568.
218. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906).
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Amendment. '219 But, in a footnote in Salvucci, Justice Rehnquist stated that "[l]egal posses-
sion of the seized good may be sufficient in some circumstances to entitle a defendant to seek
the return of the seized property if the seizure, as opposed to the search, was illegal." 220 Justice
Rehnquist supported this proposition by citing United States v. Lisk,22 1 a decision authored
by Justice Stevens when he sat on the Seventh Circuit. Lisk not only held that an illegal seizure
might entitle one to the return of the property, but also that it might permit one to exclude the
illegally seized evidence. 222
In Lisk, the defendant gave Hunt a bomb he owned, telling Hunt to keep it for him but to
return it upon request. Hunt put the bomb in the trunk of his car, where police ultimately
found it after an admittedly illegal search. Then Judge Stevens rather perfunctorily decided
Lisk did not have a privacy interest in Hunt's trunk and that he therefore could not contest the
search. 223 Judge Stevens also held, however, that Lisk's ownership of the bomb probably en-
titled him to challenge its seizure. This conclusion flowed from Judge Stevens's statement:
"[TIhere is a difference between a search and seizure. A search involves an invasion of privacy;
a seizure is a taking of property.
'224
The benefits that defendants could derive from their capacity to challenge a seizure would
be limited for two reasons. First, if the defendant can contest the search, his ability to contest
the seizure will usually be superfluous. In Lisk, the defendant did not have a right to exclude
others from the trunk because he did not own the car or have the right to contest to its
search. 225 Nor did Lisk appear to have continuing access to the trunk. 226 He clearly was not
present at the time of the search. 227 It does appear, however, that Lisk effected a valid bail-
ment to Hunt. 228 Thus, following the rules developed in this article, Lisk should have had a
legitimate expectation that the government would not unreasonably intrude into the trunk and
should have been able to contest the search. His right to challenge the seizure based on his
ownership of the bomb would not have afforded him any extra protection.
The second limitation on the capacity to contest a seizure is the difficulty of winning on the
merits. If the defendant is unable to contest the search, his only recourse is to challenge the
seizure as a violation of the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. Under this doc-
trine, as defined by the Supreme Court in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,229 police may validly
seize evidence if (1) they are legitimately in the area in which the evidence is located; (2) they
find the evidence "inadvertently;" and (3) the evidentiary value of the item was "immediately
apparent" at the time of the seizure; that is, the police could reasonably assume that it had
some nexus to criminal activity.
230
It is beyond the scope of this article to define fully the nuances of the plain view doctrine,
219. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 100 S. Ct. at 2562.
220. 100 S. Ct. at 2552 n.6.
221. 522 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1078 (1976)(Stevens, J.).
222. United States v. Lisk, 522 F.2d at 230.
223. Then Circuit Judge Stevens stated, "the invasion of Hunt's privacy was a violation of Hunt's
Fourth Amendment rights, but this violation is clearly not available to the defendant as a basis for sup-
pressing evidence acquired thereby." Id. at 230.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 229.
227. Id.
228. It was stipulated that the bomb was placed in Hunt's trunk and that Lisk told Hunt to hold the
bomb until he asked for it. Id. at 229. The twin elements of delivery by the bailor and intent to possess by
the bailee, see text accompanying note 202 supra, therefore appear to have been present.
229. 403 U.S. 443, 468-72 (1971) (plain view doctrine not applicable where location of defendant's
automobile known in advance).
230. See generally, WH1TEBREAD, note 196 supra, at 211; Moylan, The Plain View Doctrine: Unex-
pected Child of the Great "Search Incident" Geography Battle, 26 MERCER L. REV. 1047 (1975).
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which concerns substantive fourth amendment law rather than the right to invoke it in the first
instance. It is sufficient to recognize here that except when the police's former knowledge of
an item's existence means their discovery of it is not "inadvertant," 231 or when they could not
reasonably have known that the seized item was linked to criminal activity, 232 the defendant
will usually be unable to exclude evidence on the basis that it was illegally seized.
233
IV. CONCLUSION
While the Supreme Court's recent decisions on the scope of the fourth amendment have
demolished the old standing rules, they also suggest parameters for a new set of principles:
(1) A person has the capacity to contest a search resulting in the seizure of any non-
abandoned property
(a) that is in an area234 over which he has control, as defined by consent search
jurisprudence; or
(b) in which he has a possessory interest, and that is located in an area to which he has
continuing access; or
(c) in which he has a possessory interest, and that is located in an area where he is legit-
mately present at the time of the search or seizure; or
(d) which he validly bailed to a third person whose person or premises was searched.
(2) A person has the capacity to contest the seizure of any property in which he has a
possessory interest.
These rules are not predictions of what the Court will decide when facing these issues.
In addressing the scope of fourth amendment protections, the Court, as is the case in other
areas of criminal procedure, 235 is committed to a "totality of the circumstances" ap-
231. See United States v. Curran, 498 F.2d 30, 33 (9th Cir. 1974) (police smelled marijuana, entered
premises on pretext with intent to seize drug; lacking inadvertance, seizure not justified on plain view
theory); McKnight v. United States, 183 F.2d 977, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (evidence excluded where police
refrained from arresting defendant on public street in order to arrest in house where gambling evidence
could be seized).
232. See, e.g., United States v. Trevino, 62 F.R.D. 74,76 (S.D. Tex. 1974) (search of suitcase impermissi-
ble where motivated by reasons other than suspicion of its connection with bank robbery); Eisenman v.
Superior Court, 21 Cal. App. 3d 342, 350, 98 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (Ct. App. 1972) (detailed perusal of bottle
located across room from defendant after arrest not permissible when officer initially "saw nothing
unusual"); Nicholas v. State, 502 S.W. 169, 172 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (police seizure of incriminating
negatives after defendant arrested suppressed because no reason to suspect relation to criminal offense).
233. Lisk adequately illustrates why, in the typical case, the defendant will not prevail. Once the court
held (erroneously) that, as to Lisk, the police were validly in Hunt's trunk, Lisk could make only two
arguments in favor of finding the seizure illegal. He could first contend that the police knew the bomb
was in the trunk before they searched it and thus could have obtained a search warrant. Failing that, he
could argue that once they saw the bomb, the police had no way of knowing the device was contraband.
Because the search apparently was not directed at Lisk, and the bomb clearly was an illegal firearm, the
court found no merit to either contention. United States v. Lisk, 522 F.2d at 231.
234. An "area" for purposes of fourth amendment protections would include persons and houses, cars,
and containers which do not reveal the nature of their contents.
235. See Justice Douglas's dissent in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 465-66 (Douglas, J., dissenting)
indicating that the present Court appears to view the requirements regarding custodial interrogations
established in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 443-46 (1966), to be mere guidelines rather than constitutional
standards. See also Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977) (reliability is the "linchpin" for applying
totality of circumstances in out-of-court identifications); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192-200 (1972)
(totality of circumstances test used in out-of-court identifications); United States v. Cortez, 442 U.S. 707,
725-26 (1979) (totality of circumstances used to determine whether waiver of right to silence was knowing
and voluntary); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 303 (1977) (totality of circumstances failed to show
pretrial publicity affected jury and denied fair trial).
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proach. 236 However unlikely their adoption may be, these principles are not inconsistent with
the Court's current decisions and derive from concepts articulated by the Court as underlying
the fourth amendment.
As compared to the Court's current case-by-case approach, these principles have several ad-
vantages. First, they recognize explicitly that a person can have a legitimate expectation of
privacy in premises that he does not own and that he shares with another. Second, they
recognize implicitly that a substantial difference exists between the freedom one expects from
governmental intrusion and the degree of privacy one expects from the world at large. Third,
they avoid equating the scope of the individual's fourth amendment protection with the merits
of his fourth amendment claim, in contrast with Justice Rehnquist's attempt to meld the two
issues. 237 Fourth, in contrast to the Court's ill-defined approach, these principles are less likely
to encourage bad faith police conduct. 238 Most importantly, these principles provide a
relatively succinct summary of who has the capacity to contest a search and seizure.
236. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 100 S. Ct. at 2561 ("totality of circumstances" did not support showing
by defendant of legitimate or reasonable expectations of privacy to challenge search of another's purse).
In rejecting the Rakas dissenters' view that the "legitimately on the premises" test was a thoroughly
workable bright line of analysis, the Rakas majority stated: "We are rejecting blind adherence to a phrase
which at most has superficial clarity and which conceals underneath that thin veneer all the problems of
line drawing which must be faced in any conscientious effort to apply the Fourth Amendment." 439 U.S.
128, 147 (1978).
237. In Rakas, Justice Rehnquist stated that it did not serve any useful analytical purpose to consider
the issue of a defendant's capacity to contest a search and seizure as "a matter of standing, distinct from
the merits of [his] Fourth Amendment claim." Id. at 138-39. In Rawlings, he concluded:
Prior to Rakas, petitioner might have been given 'standing' in such a case to challenge a
'search' that netted these drugs but probably would have lost his claim on the merits. After
Rakas, the two inquiries merge into one: whether governmental officials violated any
legitimate expectation of privacy held by the petitioner.
100 S. Ct. at 2562.
It is not entirely clear what Justice Rehnquist means by these statements. Certainly it is possible for a
homeowner to have his legitimate expectations violated by governmental officials who invade his house,
but lose on the merits of a claim that their warrant was invalid or they conducted an improper plain view
search. In his Rawlings concurrence, Justice Blackman voiced his concern over interpreting this statement
literally:
I agree with the Court that these two inquiries 'merge into one,' in the sense that both are to
be addressed under the principles of Fourth Amendment analysis developed in Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and its progeny. But I do not read today's decision, or
Rakas, as holding that it is improper for lower courts to treat these inquiries as distinct
components of a Fourth Amendment claim. Indeed, I am convinced that it would invite
confusion to hold otherwise. It remains possible for a defendant to prove that his legitimate
interest of privacy was invaded, and yet fail to prove that the police acted illegally in doing
so. And it is equally possible for a defendant to prove that the police acted illegally, and yet
fail to prove that his own privacy interest was affected.
100 S. Ct. at 2565.
238. It could be argued that clearly defining who may assert a fourth amendment claim will enable
police to engage in intentional violations of people's privacy with impunity. The facts of United States v.
Payner, 100 S. Ct. 2439 (1980), and the Supreme Court's holding in that case, provide firm evidence of
this possibility.
In Payner, the defendant was suspected of having falsely stated on his income tax return that he did not
have a foreign bank account. A special agent for the Internal Revenue Service commissioned a private in-
vestigator to enter surreptitiously a bank officer's apartment, remove his briefcase, and deliver it to the
19811
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Indeed, the most significant drawback to the Court's multi-factor analysis is the confusion it
will engender among the lower courts. Rakas has already spawned convoluted decisions in
several jurisdictions.239 Now that the Supreme Court has made it more difficult to bring
fourth amendment claims in federal court, 240 the state courts' interpretation of decisions like
Rakas and Rawlings is likely to be widely disparate. In the interests of uniformity and protec-
ting the remaining deterrent strength of the exclusionary rule, it is crucial to provide courts
with guidance concerning the scope of the fourth amendment. Without such guidance, the
constitutional limitation on search and seizure may be further downgraded in importance.
agent who then copied approximately four hundred bank documents taken from it, all in admitted viola-
tion of the bank officer's fourth amendment rights. Id. at 2443.
The Government, however, sought to use the documents against Payner rather than the bank officer
and, under Jones and Alderman, Payner did not have standing to contest the illegal entry and seizure.
The federal district court suppressed the evidence, using its inherent supervisory power. It found that "the
Government [had] affirmatively counsel[led] its agents that the Fourth Amendment standing limitation
permits them to purposefully conduct an unconstitutional search and seizure of one individual in order to
obtain evidence against third parties." 434 F. Supp. 113, 131-33 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
The Supreme Court, while denouncing the Government's bad faith actions in the case, held that the
supervisory power does not authorize a federal court to suppress evidence which the defendant himself
could not suppress. 100 S. Ct. at 2447.
It is clear that Payner has sapped further deterrent strength from the exclusionary rule. It is unlikely,
however, that most police are as legally sophisticated as the tax agent in that case. Moreover, while the
rules proposed here would not have deterred the agent in Payner, they are ambiguous enough to require a
policeman contemplating a bad faith search in other types of situations to deliberate carefully. Whether a
given person has a right to consent and exclude others from a particular area, or has taken reasonable
precautions to maintain the privacy of property he has bailed to another, will usually be a difficult deter-
mination. In any event, the above proposals would probably be less conducive to bad faith police actions
than the Court's current, ill-defined analysis that, as Justice White points out in his Rakas dissent, may
lead police to think they have considerable leeway in conducting searches and seizures. 439 U.S. at 168-69
(White, J., dissenting).
239. See State v. List, 166 N.J. Super. 368, 399 A.2d 1040 (1979)(defendants sought to suppress drugs
seized in a van that they, together with owner-operator of van, jointly owned and possessed). The court
stated that defendants' contention that legitimate presence plus a possessory interest in the seized items
should give them a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched van "simply runs counter to the true
rationale and holding established . . . by the [Rakas] court." Id. at 370, 399 A.2d at 1042.
The court then held that because the owner of the van could have given a valid consent to the search,
the search "did not violate defendant-passengers [sic] Fourth Amendment expectations of privacy under
the United States Constitution." Id. at 370, 399 A.2d at 1042. As Professor LaFave notes, "[tihis result is
clearly in error, as is apparent when [one] consider[s] the bizarre result it calls for: defendants never have
standing to object to a search [of] their property if it was in such a place that some third party could have
(but in fact did not) give lawful consent to search for it." 3 LAFAVE, supra note 118, Supplement at 67
(emphasis in original). See also State v. Jordan, 40 N.C. App. 412, 252 S.E.2d 857 (1979).
Probably the worst indictment of the Court's current approach, however, was unintentionally delivered
by the Kentucky Supreme Court in its Rawlings decision. In what it termed a "confession," it stated,
"[W]e find the concept of 'standing' totally incomprehensible and, to the extent of overlap with Fourth
Amendment rights, equally incapable of understanding. . . . We are not sure of the effect of Rakas
although it seems to reject the theory of Jones on 'standing."' Rawlings v. Commonwealth, 581 S.W.2d
348, 349-50 (Ky. 1979).
When a state's highest court has experienced such difficulty interpreting a United States Supreme Court
decision, it is unlikely that lower courts will be more successful.
240. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). See also note 19 supra.
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